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I. INTRODUCTION
Tax treaties and trade agreements employ radically different methods of
settling intergovernmental disputes. Most bilateral income tax treaties rely ex-
clusively on intergovernmental consultation and negotiation for this purpose.
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In contrast, the principal multilateral trade agreement, the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),' employs a quasi-judicial or legalistic system
that generates decisions that cannot be blocked by the losing party. It is
tempting to conclude that the GATT has evolved much further in its institu-
tional structure than tax treaties have. If so, perhaps the dispute settlement
systems of income tax treaties should be revised to resemble the more "so-
phisticated" GATT model.2 Or, to go one step further, perhaps we should
bring income tax measures directly under the GAT or a new multilateral
agreement on investment with legalistic dispute settlement provisions.
Proposals for such innovations are becoming more common. Rather than
simply assuming the GATT model to be more sophisticated, however, one
should analyze carefully the appropriateness of specific dispute settlement
mechanisms in different contexts. This Article begins by arguing that, in fun-
damental ways, the tax and trade contexts are much more closely related than
the academic literature and government practice traditionally have recognized.
Tax treaties and trade agreements have the same underlying goal of facilitating
international trade and investment, and they employ analogous rules to achieve
it. Given these fundamental similarities in goals and approaches, it is initially
puzzling that the two kinds of agreements should employ radically different
dispute settlement systems.
The Article goes on to argue that this disparity can usefully be analyzed
by drawing upon analytical methods and insights developed by international
relations theorists. This approach involves viewing intergovernmental dispute
settlement systems not as means for dictating outcomes but as devices for fa-
cilitating international cooperation by changing the political context in which
sovereign governments make self-interested decisions. This approach focuses
1. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Apr. 15, 1994, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-THE
LEGAL TEXTS 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 [hereinafter Final Act]. The Uruguay Round of GATT
negotiations, which concluded in 1994, substantially strengthened the institutions for international trade,
including the dispute settlement system. The Uruguay Round Agreements include the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULrrTERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-THE LEGAL TEXTS 5 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1144
[hereinafter WTO Agreement]. A number of additional agreements are annexed to the WTO Agreement.
These include the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTLATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-THE LEGAL TxTS 21 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1154 [hereinafter GATT
1994]. Article l(a) of GATT 1994 in turn incorporates the original GAIT agreement from 1947 as
rectified, amended, or modified up to the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. See Text of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, IV GAIT B.I.S.D. 1 (1969) (the GATT agreement of 1947 as
rectified, amended, or modified up to the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement) [hereinafter
GATT 1947]. The annexes to the WTO Agreement also include the General Agreement on Trade in
Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B,
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTiLATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-THE LEGAL TEXTS 325
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1167 [hereinafter GATS], and the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIAnONS-THE LEGAL TOM 404 (1994), 33 1.L.M. 1226 [hereinafter Dispute Settlement
Understanding].
2. See, e.g., TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TAX
ADMINISTRATIONS para. 4.168, at IV-54 (Organisation for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. 1995) [hereinafter
OECD TRANsFER PRICING GUIDEuNES] (suggesting that it might be desirable to reconsider design of tax
treaty dispute settlement mechanisms in light of GAiT's "increasingly sophisticated procedures and
institutions to resolve international trade disputes").
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one's attention on the similarities and differences in the contexts in which
politicians make decisions about international cooperation in. different regimes,
such as the trade and tax regimes. The Article identifies significant differences
between these two regimes from this perspective and concludes that it makes
sense for the procedures for resolving intergovernmental tax disputes to re-main much less legalistic than the procedures that have evolved under trade
agreements.
Part II of the Article discusses the legalistic dispute settlement system
that has developed under the GATT. It argues that tax treaties and trade agree-
ments are very closely related, raising the question of why tax treaty dispute
settlement mechanisms are so different from the dispute settlement system of
the GATT. Indeed, during the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, many
countries proposed that disputes about discriminatory income tax measures be
brought directly under the jurisdiction of the GATT's dispute settlement sys-
tem. The United States opposed this proposal, with the result that tax treaty
mechanisms, where applicable, still have exclusive jurisdiction over income
tax disputes.
Part I then turns to a more detailed analysis of dispute settlement
mechanisms in tax treaties. Under most treaties, consultations and negotiations
between designated tax officials of the two treaty countries are the exclusive
means for resolving disputes. There is a nascent trend toward supplementing
this mechanism with voluntary binding arbitration, but only in the case of fact-
specific disputes. Indeed, the tax treaty dispute settlement mechanisms in gen-
eral are extremely unlikely to resolve disputes that raise policy-level conflicts
between domestic tax laws and tax treaty obligations. It is likely that such dis-
putes will have to be pursued through diplomatic channels.
In Part IV, the Article begins its analysis of the polar cases of tax treaty
dispute settlement and GATT dispute settlement from a theoretical perspec-
tive, drawing upon the international relations theory insight that international
cooperation can emerge and be maintained if countries mutually adopt re-
taliatory strategies. The Article argues that intergovernmental dispute settle-
ment systems can serve as devices for managing these strategies to prevent
them from breaking down under uncertainty. The Article concludes, however,
that this function is less critical in the tax context than in the international
trade context.
Part V continues this theoretical analysis, utilizing the international rela-
tions theory that the maintenance of cooperative outcomes depends on the
generation and dissemination of certain types of information. The Article ar-
gues that intergovernmental dispute settlement systems can serve as devices
for such production and distribution of information about the requirements of
the regime, the performance of the parties under the regime, and the reactions
of other parties to one's own performance. Intergovernmental dispute settle-
ment systems also can facilitate the development and spread of reputational in-
formation. The Article concludes, however, that the international tax regime
is more transparent than the international trade regime, so there is less need
for legalistic dispute settlement to perform these functions in the tax context
than in the trade context.
Finally, Part VI discusses the costs of legalistic dispute settlement. The
desirability of highly legalistic systems for any international regime depends
1998]
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on the balance between the benefits and costs of such systems in the context of
that particular regime. Part VI argues that legalistic dispute settlement could
impose significant costs in the international tax context and that these costs
probably would exceed those of the international trade context. Given the dif-
ferent balances between benefits and costs in the two areas, the legalistic dis-
pute settlement procedures that have evolved under trade agreements should
not be assumed to be the best model for resolving disputes under income tax
treaties. This is particularly so in the case of disputes involving policy-level
conflicts between domestic law and treaty obligations in which the problem of
regime maintenance becomes prominent.
I. LEGALISTIC DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER THE GATT AND ITS
APPLICATION TO INCOME TAX DISPUTES
International trade scholars have long debated whether the dispute set-
tlement systems in trade agreements should be based on a "legalistic" model
or on a "pragmatic," "antilegalistic" model.' The "legalistic" model favors
clearly defined rules and third-party adjudication procedures that can apply
such rules objectively in disputed cases. The "antilegalistic" model views
rules merely as guidelines and favors the diplomatic resolution of disputes
through intergovernmental consultation and negotiation.
Section A below discusses how the dispute settlement procedures in the
GATT have evolved, particularly in recent years, into a highly legalistic sys-
tem. Section B examines the theoretical relationship between trade agreements
and income tax treaties. This Section argues that these two types of interna-
tional agreements are much more closely related than has been recognized
historically. In light of this relationship, it is puzzling that intergovernmental
income tax disputes are not also subject to a legalistic dispute settlement sys-
tem, similar to the system in the GATT. Finally, Section C discusses the con-
troversy that arose during the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations when
trade negotiators from many countries proposed bringing income tax disputes
directly under the jurisdiction of the GATT. This controversy was likely a
precursor of future debates about the relationship between international trade
and investment treaties, income tax measures, and income tax treaties and is
examined as such.
A. The Evolution of a Legalistic Dispute Settlement System in the GATT
The GATT originally contained only a skeletal dispute settlement pro-
cedure. The rules governing dispute settlement were principally contained in
3. See, e.g., KENNErH W. DAM, THE GAIT: LAw AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 3-5 (1970) (juxtaposing "legalism" and "pragmatism" within framework of GATT);
OLVIER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTrM 61-64 (1985)
(explaining that "[tihe General Agreement has both juridical and pragmatic features"); William J. Davey,
Dispute Settlement in GATI, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51, 65-67 (1987) (distinguishing "legalistic" and
"antilegalistic" dispute settlement models); Robert E. Hudec, GAYT Dispute Settlement After the Tokyo
Round: An Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145, 151-53 (1980) (discussing tension in GATT
regulatory policy between "legalist" and "antilegalist" schools of thought); Phillip R. Trimble, Internation-
al Trade and the "Rule of Law", 83 MIcH. L. Rnv. 1016, 1017-18 (1985) (describing "legalist" and
"nonlegalistic" views of GATI).
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a few sentences of article 23.' This article provided for consultation between
contracting parties in any dispute in which one contracting party believed
that a GATT benefit was being "nullified or impaired" or that the attainment
of any objective of the GATT was being impeded by the actions of another
member.5 If consultation did not result in a satisfactory settlement, article 23
provided that the parties could refer the dispute to the GATT members.6 The
members acting jointly would investigate the matter and make recommenda-
tions or rule on it.7 If the members ruled in favor of the complainant, they
could authorize it to retaliate against the defendant by suspending the appli-
cation of some of its own concessions or obligations under the GATT.8
Starting from these minimal provisions, the GATT dispute settlement
procedures gradually evolved through innovation and practice, although not
consistently in the direction of greater legalism. In particular, during the
1960s, the prevailing attitude toward GATT dispute settlement changed from
an earlier commitment to a legalist approach to a decidedly antilegalist ap-
proach.9 Since then, it has moved sharply back in the direction of greater le-
galism.
4. GAIT 1947, supra note 1, art. 23.
5. Id. art. 23(1). Specifically, article 23(1) provides that:
If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly
under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective
of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this
Agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it
conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation,
the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make
written representations or proposals to the other contracting party or parties which it
considers to be concerned. Any contracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic
consideration to the representations or proposals made to it.
Id.; see also id. art. 22 (outlining requirements for consultation).
6. See id. art. 23(2). Specifically, article 23(2) provides that:
If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties concerned within a
reasonable time . . . the matter may be referred to the CONTRACTiNG PARTIES. The
CONTRACTING PARTIES shall promptly investigate any matter so referred to them and shall
make appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to be
concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate. The CONTRACTNG PARTIES may
consult with contracting parties, with the Economic and Social Council of the United Na-
tions and with any appropriate intergovernmental organization in cases where they consider
such consultation necessary. If the CONT ACnNG PARTiES consider that the circumstances
are serious enough to justify such action, they may authorize a contracting party or parties
to suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of such concessions or
other obligations under this Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in the circum-
stances. If the application to any contracting party of any concession or other obligation is
in fact suspended, that contracting party shall then be free, not later than sixty days after
such action is taken, to give written notice to the Executive Secretary to the CONTRACTING
PARTIES of its intention to withdraw from this Agreement and such withdrawal shall take ef-




9. See Hudec, supra note 3, at 151-53. Professor Hudec attributes this movement toward anti-
legalism to two factors. First, several of the original GATr rules became outdated, and governments no
longer wished to be held to them. Second, the distribution of political power within the GAIT changed as
the European Economic Community (EEC) and Japan became more powerful relative to the United States.
Unlike the United States, which had designed the legalist model, the EEC countries and Japan traditionally
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The legalist position triumphed in the Uruguay Round, which produced
a quasi-judicial dispute settlement system whose rulings cannot be blocked by
one party. Under the procedures set forth in the Uruguay Round's Dispute
Settlement Understanding, the complaining party may request the establish-
ment of a panel to adjudicate the dispute.' Upon receipt of such a request, the
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) must set up a panel unless there is a consen-
sus in the DSB not to do so"-a rule known as "reverse consensus." 2 Since
the complaining party can prevent the formation of this "reverse" consensus,
that party effectively has a right to the establishment of a panel. "Reverse con-
sensus" replaces the previous rule that the DSB would create a panel only if
there were a consensus to do so. 3 Under this earlier regime, the defendant
could prevent the formation of consensus and thus always could block the
formation of a panel.
The Dispute Settlement Understanding specifies time limits for comple-
tion of the various stages in the panel process.' Under these new procedures,
the panel normally should issue a report detailing its conclusions within six to
eight months of its establishment.
The Dispute Settlement Understanding eliminates the possibility that one
party will block adoption of the panel's decision by providing that "[w]ithin
[sixty] days after the date of circulation of a panel report to the Members, the
report shall be adopted at a DSB meeting unless a party to the dispute formally
have favored a more diplomatic approach. In addition, the developing country members became more
powerful. These countries were excused from many GATT obligations, yet they began to demand strict
enforcement of developed country obligations; the developed countries reacted by disparagingly dismissing
these demands as excessively "legalistic." See id.; see also ROBERT E. HUDEc, ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 12-13 (1993)
(explaining how change in GATT's composition and "higher level of conflict" in 1960s resulted in "sharp
decline in the status of GATT law").
10. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 1, art. 4(7) (providing for complaining
party's request to establish panel if consultation fails to resolve dispute). The general rules regarding
consultations are set out in article 4 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. See id.
The Dispute Settlement Understanding provides for alternatives to formal dispute settlement if
parties cannot resolve their disagreements. Article 5 includes provisions on good offices, conciliation, and
mediation, and states specifically that the Director-General may offer to provide such services in an effort
to assist members in resolving disputes. See id. art. 5(6). These informal methods may be used in addition
to or in lieu of the panel process. See id. art. 5(2)-(5). In addition, article 25 allows the parties, by mutual
agreement, to submit a dispute to binding arbitration as an alternative to the establishment of a panel. See
id. art. 25(1)-(2).
11. See id. art. 6(1).
12. The GAIT Secretariat proposes panel members. See id. art. 8(6). If the parties do not agree
on panel members, the WTO Director General may appoint the panel on his or her own authority, in
consultation with the chair of the DSB and the chairs of the relevant council or committee. See id. art. 8(7).
The Understanding gives the parties 20 days to establish their own terms of reference for the panel; if the
parties are unable to agree, it provides default terms of reference. See id. art. 7(1).
13. Although the GATT established a one nation-one vote system, see GATT 1947, supra note
1, art. 25(3), it traditionally has operated on the basis of consensus. See Ministerial Declaration, Nov. 29,
1982, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 9, 16 (1983) (noting that "[t]he CONTRACrIMG PARTIES reaffirmed
that consensus will continue to be the traditional method of resolving disputes; however, they agreed that
obstruction in the process of dispute settlement shall be avoided"). Because of the requirement of conse n-
sus, a single vote-including the vote of the defendant--could block the formation of a panel. Although the
requirement of consensus rarely, if ever, resulted in a refusal to establish a panel, it did often result in long
delays in doing so. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AN'D TEXT 341-42 (3d ed. 1995); Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution
in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph over Diplomats, 29 Ir'L LAw. 389, 402 (1995).
14. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 1, app. 3, para. 12.
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notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not
to adopt the report. " t Again, this "reverse consensus" rule replaces the pre-
vious rule that a panel report would be adopted only if there were a consensus
to do so, a system that gave the losing party the power to block adoption.' 6
A party has the right to appeal an adverse panel decision to a new appel-
late tribunal, known as the "Appellate Body." 1 The Appellate Body's rulings
are subject to the same "reverse consensus" rule as regular panel reports.
Such a ruling is to be adopted (absent consensus to the contrary) within thirty
days of its circulation to DSB members.'I
Finally, the Dispute Settlement Understanding provides for the moni-
toring of compliance."' A losing defendant must indicate what actions it plans
to take to implement "within a reasonable period of time" the panel's recom-
mendation.' If there is further disagreement regarding compliance, the ag-
grieved state may resort to the original panel for a ruling."' Should the defen-
dant continue to fail to implement the recommendation, the complaining state
is to negotiate with the defendant to determine the amount of "mutually ac-
ceptable compensation."' If the parties cannot agree on the amount of com-
pensation, the complainant may request authority from the DSB to retaliate by
suspending concessions in an amount "equivalent to the level of the nullifica-
tion and impairment" suffered. 3 The defendant may demand arbitration re-
15. Id. art. 16(4) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
16. Although parties did not often permanently block adoption of reports, this did happen on
occasion, and on other occasions parties delayed the adoption of reports for months or years. See JACKSON
ET AL., supra note 13, at 342-43; Young, supra note 13, at 402.
17. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 1, arts. 16(4), 17. This tribunal has seven
members and hears appeals in panels of three. See id. art. 17(1). The members are to be nongovernmental
individuals "of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the subject
matter of the covered agreements generally." Id. art. 17(3). In addition, the members are to be "broadly
representative of membership in the WTO." Id. The Appellate Body is limited to considering issues of law
covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel. See id. art. 17(6). The
appellate proceedings are normally to take only 60 days and are never to exceed 90 days. See id. art. 17(5).
18. See id. art. 17(14). Given the "consensus to overrule" requirement for panel and Appellate
Body decisions, countries disappointed by legal rulings may be tempted to turn to WTO "legislative"
mechanisms to reverse judicial decisions, although, as currently structured, these mechanisms are
extremely cumbersome. One such mechanism is to propose a formal amendment to the relevant treaty.
Most important GATT provisions, including the dispute resolution provisions, however, cannot be
amended without the unanimous consent of all WTO members. See WTO Agreement, supra note 1, art.
10(2), (8). Another possibility would be to propose that WTO member states approve an "interpretation"
of the treaty that reverses an interpretation issued by the Appellate Body. The WTO Charter provides that
"interpretations" can be adopted with less than a consensus vote, but it further stipulates that the
interpretation procedure "shall not be used in a manner that would undermine the amendment provisions in
Article X." Id. art. 9(2). Thus, in the end, the "consensus to overrule" requirement embodied in the
dispute resolution provisions is buttressed by the amendment and interpretation procedures.
19. Under the pre-Uruguay Round GATT, if the offending member declined to follow the panel
report's recommendations (as sometimes happened), the GATT usually proved to be too weak to induce
compliance. See HUDEc, supra note 9, at 363 (noting "the very real possibility-indeed, practice-of
government vetoes that block GATT Council adoption of panel rulings and also block Council authoriza-
tion of retaliatory sanctions"); Young, supra note 13, at 404.
20. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 1, art. 21(3). The reasonable period of
time may be set by the member concerned if approved by the DSB, by agreement of the contending
parties, or, absent agreement, by arbitration. Normally, the period will not exceed 15 months. See id. art.
21(4).
21. See id. art. 21(5).
22. Id. art. 22(2).
23. Id. GATT article 23 has always permitted the GATT contracting parties to authorize the
prevailing party to suspend concessions owed to the losing party (sometimes referred to as "retaliation") if
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garding the appropriate level of retaliation." Such a determination is not ap-
pealable and can be overturned only by a unanimous vote of the DSB.'
Under the domestic law of the United States, the Uruguay Round
Agreements do not preempt inconsistent federal laws,26 and rulings by dispute
settlement panels and the appellate body have no legal effect. 7 A World Trade
Organization (WTO) dispute settlement panel or appellate body ruling, how-
ever, apparently creates an obligation under international law to comply with
the ruling's recommendation that the member country make its law consistent
with the Uruguay Round Agreements.'
Disputes raising issues of policy-level conflicts between domestic law
and international obligations routinely are brought before the GATT dispute
settlement system. Recent post-Uruguay Round examples include disputes
about the legality under the GATT of a European Union ban on hormone-
treated beef,29 a U.S. ban on certain imports of shrimp (adopted as an environ-
the latter fails to end its violation of GATT rules. Such authorization has been granted only once-in 1955
to allow the Netherlands to suspend concessions to the United States as a result of U.S. quotas on Dutch
agricultural products. See JACKSON Er AL., supra note 13, at 344. The Netherlands apparently never
utilized the authorization. See id.
24. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 1, art. 22(6).
25. See id. art. 22(7).
26. The legislation implementing the Uruguay Round Agreements specifies that "[n]o provision
of any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the application of any such provision to any person or
circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have effect." Uruguay Round
Agreements Act § 102(a)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1) (1994). This legislation further specifies that
[n]o State law, or the application of such a State law, may be declared invalid as to any per-
son or circumstance on the ground that the provision or application is inconsistent with any
of the Uruguay Round Agreements, except in an action brought by the United States for the
purpose of declaring such law or application invalid.
Id. § 102(b)(2)(A).
In contrast, income tax treaties are self-executing. See 2 FEDERAL INCOME TAx PROJECT,
AMERICAN LAW INSTITuTE, INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INcOME TAXATION 22 (1992)
[hereinafter FEDERAL INcOME TAX PROJECt] (noting that "[i]n the United States tax treaties are self-
executing"). See generally RESrATEEN (THMD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED
STATES § II cmt. h, reporter's note 5 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (discussing distinction between
self-executing and non-self-executing international agreements). Thus, they preempt federal law under the
later-in-time rule. See infra notes 125-126 and accompanying text.
27. Even in an action brought by the United States for the purpose of invali dating a state law that
is inconsistent with the GATT, "a report of a dispute settlement panel or the Appellate Body convened
under the Dispute Settlement Understanding regarding the State law, or the law of any political subdivision
thereof, shall not be considered as binding or otherwise accorded deference." 19 U.S.C. §
3512(b)(2)(B)(i).
28. The text of the Uruguay Round Agreements is not entirely clear on this point. The WTO
Agreement provides that "[e]ach Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and
administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements." WTO Agreement,
supra note 1, art. 16(4). The meaning of this provision depends, however, on what a Member's obligations
under the Agreements are interpreted to be. Arguably, a Member does not have an absolute duty under the
Uruguay Round Agreements to make its laws consistent with those Agreements because they provide for
the alternative of compensating the complaining party with trade concessions. Professor Jackson discusses
this language of the WTO Agreement as well as the language of the Dispute Settlement Understanding and
concludes that a WTO ruling does create an international law obligation to comply with the ruling's
recommendation that the member country make its laws consistent with the Agreements. See generally
John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding-Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal
Obligation, 91 AM. J. INT'LL. 60 (1997).
29. See World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel on EC Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones), Complaint by the United States, WT/DS26/R/USA, available in 1997 WL
569984 (Aug. 18, 1997); World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel on EC Measures Concerning
Meat and Meat Products (Hornones), Complaint by Canada, WT/DS48/R/CAN, available in 1997 WL
561677 (Aug. 18, 1997).
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mental protection measure),3" provisions of the U.S. Helms-Burton Act im-
posing economic sanctions on Cuba,3' Canadian policies restricting the im-
portation of periodicals (adopted to preserve Canadian culture),32 and U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency standards for gasoline.
B. The Relationship Between Income Tax Treaties and Trade Agreements
What are the implications of this evolution of legalistic GATT institu-
tions for international income tax policy and treaties? This question has begun
to surface in practice, but it has received virtually no scholarly analysis. In-
deed, the academic literature largely fails to connect international tax policy to
international trade policyY' This separation of disciplines is unfortunate. In-
ternational tax policy can have an enormous impact on international trade.
Indeed, a country can use discriminatory income tax measures directly to un-
dercut the commitments it makes in international trade agreements.
Although they seldom are discussed together, income tax treaties and
trade agreements are closely related. As noted above, they have the same un-
derlying goal of facilitating international trade and investment,36 and they em-
30. See World Trade Organization, First Written Submission by India, Panel on United States--
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, available in 1997 WL 304821 (May 20, 1997)
(statement of dispute). The DSB established a panel for this dispute on February 25, 1997. See World
Trade Organization, Communication from the Chairman of the Panel on United States-Import Prohibition
of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/10, available in 1997 WL 584387 (Sept. 22, 1997).
The panel currently expects to complete its work by the end of March 1998. See id.
31. See World Trade Organization, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European
Communities, United States-The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, WT/DS38/2, available in
1996 WL 908910 (Oct. 4, 1996) (statement of dispute) [hereinafter World Trade Organization, Request for
the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities]. On April 25, 1997, the panel suspended its
proceedings to allow the European Communities and the United States to attempt to negotiate a solution.
See World Trade Organization, Communication from the Chairman of the Panel on United States-The
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, WT/DS38/5, available in 1997 WL 371060 (Apr. 25,
1997).
32. See World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body on Canada-Certain Measures
Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/AB/R, available in 1997 WL 398913 (June 30, 1997).
33. See World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body on United States-Standards
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS21AB/R, available in 1996 WL 227476 (Apr. 29,
1996).
34. See Richard J. Vann, A Model Tax Treaty for the Asian-Pacific Region? (pt. 1), 45 BULL.
FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 99, 109 (1991) (noting that tax treaties are usually written in their own
terms without any clear connection to trade policy).
35. See JOEL SLEMROD, FREE TRADE TAXATION AND PRoTECTONISr TAXATON 1 (National
Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 4902, 1994) (stating that "tax policy can have at least as
large an effect on the flow of goods across countries... and the gains from trade as thefl trade policy
instruments"); Joel Slemrod, Comments on John Matti, TRIMS, Policy Change, and the Role of the GAIT,
in ANALYTCAL AND NEGOTIATrN IssuEs IN TE GLoBAL TRADING SYSrEM 496, 497 (Alan V. Deardorff
& Robert M. Stem eds., 1994) (arguing that "tax policy can have an enormous impact on the cross-border
flow of commodities").
36. International trade agreements explicitly have the goal of facilitating international trade and
investment. For example, the North American Free Trade Agreement declares its objectives, among
others, to be to "eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross-border movement of, goods and
services between the territories of the Parties" and to "increase substantially investment opportunities in the
territories of the Parties." North American Free Trade Agreement, done on Dec. 8-17, 1992, art. 102, 32
I.L.M. 289, 297 [hereinafter NAFTA]. Similarly, the preamble to the WTO Agreement declares that the
agreement is "directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the
elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations." WTO Agreement, supra note 1,
pmbl.
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ploy similar rules to achieve that goal. In particular, the GATT permits mem-
ber countries to impose taxes on imported goods, both at the border (tariffs)
and after the goods have entered the country (internal taxes). The GATT
members agree, however, to limit or "bind" many of their tariffs at fixed lev-
els.3 7 These tariff bindings are backed up by a "national treatment" or nondis-
crimination obligation applicable to internal taxes on goods: Member countries
are prohibited from imposing internal taxes on imported goods that are less
favorable than the internal taxes they impose on similar domestic goods. 8
In much the same way, income tax treaties generally permit countries to
impose taxes on the income from imported capital, both when the income is
repatriated across the border (withholding taxes on dividends, interest, royal-
ties, and similar items of income)39 and when the income is earned within the
country (regular income taxes).4" The treaty countries agree, however, to limit
withholding taxes to reciprocally agreed-upon rates." These limits are backed
up by a nondiscrimination obligation42 applicable to regular income taxes.43
Although it is perhaps not so obvious, international tax agreements also have the goal of facilitating
international trade and investment. See, e.g., MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL art. I
commentary, para. 7, at c(1)-2 to c(1)-3 (Organisation for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. 1995) [hereinafter
OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION] ("The purpose of double taxation conventions is to promote, by
eliminating international double taxation, exchanges of goods and services, and the movement of capital
and persons."); FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROYECr, supra note 26, at 1 ("The principal function of income
tax treaties is to facilitate international trade and investment by removing-or preventing the erection of-
tax barriers to the free international exchange of goods and services, and the free international movement
of capital and persons.").
37. See GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. 2.
38. See id. art. 3(2).
39. See, e.g., Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, Sept. 26, 1980,
U.S.-Can., arts. 10(2) (dividends), 11(2) (interest), 12(2) (royalties), T.I.A.S. No. 11,087, at 10, 12, 14
(entered into force Aug. 16, 1984) [hereinafter U.S.-Canada Tax Convention]; OECD MODEL TAX
CONVENTION, supra note 36, arts. 10(2) (dividends), 11(2) (interest).
40. See, e.g., U.S.-Canada Tax Convention, supra note 39, arts. 7(1) (business profits), 14
(independent personal services), 15(1) (dependent personal services), at 8, 17; OECD MODEL TAX
CONvENTON, supra note 36, arts. 7(1) (business profits), 14(1) (independent personal services), 15(1)
(dependent personal services).
41. See, e.g., U.S.-Canada Tax Convention, supra note 39, arts. 10(2) (limiting withholding
taxes on dividends to 10% or 15%, depending on degree of ownership), 11(2) (limiting withholding taxes
on interest to 15%), 12(2) (limiting withholding taxes on royalties to 10%), at 10-12, 14; OECD MODEL
TAX CONVENTION, supra note 36, arts. 10(2) (limiting withholding taxes on dividends to 5% or 15%,
depending on degree of ownership), 11(2) (imiting withholding taxes on interest to 10%), 12(1)
(prohibiting withholding taxes on royalties).
42. See, e.g., U.S.-Canada Tax Convention, supra note 39, art. 25, at 23; OECD MODEL TAX
CONvENTON, supra note 36, art. 24.
One explanation of the tax treaty nondiscrimination article is that it protects the parties' bargain
concerning withholding-tax rates. See U.S. DEP'T O: THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL
AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTrMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE 77 n.12 (1992). Tax treaties directly
limit withholding-tax rates but generally do not directly limit host country corporate income tax rates. Host
countries, therefore, could alter the bargain, without increasing withholding-tax rates, by increasing the
level of corporate income taxation of foreign and foreign-owned firms. The treaty nondiscrimination
obligation indirectly prevents this by requiring that changes in corporate income taxation burden wholly
domestic firms to the same extent as foreign and foreign-owned firms. See id.
Another explanation of the nondiscrimination article is that it serves as a backstop to the treaty
provisions on elimination of double taxation. These provisions require the treaty partners to eliminate the
international double taxation of their residents either by exempting certain foreign-source income from
taxation or by giving a tax credit for foreign taxes paid on certain foreign-source income. See, e.g. , OECD
MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 36, arts. 23A, 23B. If residence countries adopt the exemption
method, investment in host countries will bear the same rate of tax (the rate established by the host
country) regardless of the place of residence of the investor-so-called "capital import neutrality." A
1998] Antilegalistic Approaches to Dispute Resolution
Under the nondiscrimination obligation, a treaty country may not tax the do-
mestic "permanent establishment" of a firm that is a treaty resident of another
treaty country less favorably than it would tax a domestic firm carrying on the
same business.' Similarly, it may not tax a domestic firm that is owned or
controlled by residents of the other treaty country less favorably than it would
tax a similar domestic firm that was owned and controlled by domestic resi-
dents.
45
Notwithstanding this close relationship between international income
taxation and international trade, international agreements historically have
failed to link the two subjects. Until the Uruguay Round, the GATT was vir-
tually silent about income taxes, as opposed to taxes on goods such as tariffs
46
and internal taxes on goods.47 The principal exception was that the pre-Uru-
guay Round GATT prohibited the use of income tax preferences as a means of
subsidizing exports and authorized importing countries to impose "counter-
vailing duties" to offset such subsidies.48
This prohibition was the basis on which a GATT panel struck down not
only a narrow provision of the U.S. income tax system but also a fundamental
feature of the income tax systems of Belgium, France, and the Netherlands.
Under prior American tax law, a U.S. corporation could set up a foreign ex-
port subsidiary as a Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC). The
nondiscrimination rule is necessary to prevent the host country from subverting this equal treatment. If
residence countries adopt the credit method, host countries with low tax rates will have a strong incentive
to impose discriminatory taxes-so-called "soak-up taxes"-on foreign investment; these taxes ultimately
will be borne by the residence countries rather than by the investors and therefore will not discourage
investment. The nondiscrimination rule is necessary to prohibit such opportunistic behavior.
43. Although the nondiscrimination obligation in tax treaties is analogous to the national
treatment obligation in the GATI, the two obligations are not identical: The tax treaty nondiscrimination
obligation is generally less restrictive than the GATT's national treatment obligation. See infra note 62.
Moreover, the concept of nondiscrimination in the international tax context is problematic if viewed as a
requirement of competitive neutrality, because it is the interaction of the host country's tax system and the
residence country's tax system that determines the competitive position of the residence country's firms
when they engage in business operations in the host country. For example, if those firms are able fully to
credit host country taxes against their residence country tax liability, the host country's tax system will
have no effect on the competitive position of those firms, even if it is discriminatory.
44. See, e.g., OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 36, art. 24(3).
45. See, e.g., id. art. 24(5).
46. Tariffs are taxes on goods and services as they are imported or exported across national
borders.
47. See, e.g., GATT 1947, supra note 1, arts. 2 (tariff bindings), 3 (national treatment on
internal taxation of goods), 6(4) (rebate of taxes on exported goods at border).
48. See id. arts. 6 (countervailing duties), 26 (subsidies); see also Agreement on Interpretation
and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the GATT, Illustrative List of Export Subsidies, Apr.
12, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 80 (1980). This prohibition was at issue in the DISC cases. See
infra note 49 and accompanying text.
49. See Panel Report on United States Tax Legislation (DISC), Nov. 12, 1976, GATI B.I.S.D.
(23d Supp.) at 98 (1977); Panel Report on Income Tax Practices Maintained by Belgium, Nov. 12, 1976,
GAIT B.I.S.D. (23d Supp.) at 127 (1977); Panel Report on Income Tax Practices Maintained by France,
Nov. 12, 1976, GAT B.I.S.D. (23d Supp.) at 114 (1977); Panel Report on Income Tax Practices
Maintained by the Netherlands, Nov. 12, 1976, GATT B.I.S.D. (23d Supp.) at 137 (1977). In response to
the European Community's complaint in this case, the United States brought three countercomplaints
alleging that the territorial tax systems of Belgium, France, and the Netherlands also violated the GATT.
For further discussions of the DISC case, see generally HUDEC, supra note 9, at 59-100; Robert E.
Hudec, Reforming GATT Adjudication Procedures: The Lessons of the DISC Case, 72 MINN. L. REV.
1443 (1988); and John H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of international Trade: The DISC Case in GATT, 72
AM. J. INT'LL. 747 (1978). Hudec notes that "[the DISC case is considered by many to be the largest and
most conspicuous failure in the history of GATT litigation." HUDEc, supra note 9, at 59.
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combined export earnings would be allocated between the DISC and its parent
company according to one of several formulas in the statute. Taxation of a
portion of the profits allocated to the DISC would be deferred until one of a
number of future events occurred. In 1972, the European Community brought
a GATT complaint charging that this tax deferral violated article 16(4) of the
GATT, which prohibits certain export subsidies." The GATT dispute settle-
ment panel reasoned that deferral is equivalent to a partial exemption from
taxation because the interest component normally levied for late or deferred
payments is not applicable. Therefore, the panel concluded, the DISC legisla-
tion violated article 16(4).' In addition, the GATT panel ruled in favor of the
United States on its countercomplaints that the basic territorial tax systems of
the Netherlands, Belgium, and France also violated article 16(4).5" In 1981,
the United States and the European Community reached a compromise agree-
ment in which the GATT Council adopted the panel reports in the DISC case
with an "understanding" that limited their broad scope but under which the
DISC legislation still violated the GATT. 3 Congress ultimately repealed the
DISC legislation in 1984, replacing it with arguably GATT-consistent legisla-
tion authorizing Foreign Sales Corporations (FSCs). 4
This pre-Uruguay Round case dramatically illustrates the potential for
the GATT dispute settlement system to take on conflicts raising issues of fun-
damental tax policy and to strike down domestic tax laws that violate GATT
principles. Prior to the Uruguay Round, however, such cases were very rare
because the GATT's restrictions on income tax measures were so narrow.
50. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
51. In a 1960 Declaration, the contracting parties agreed that the practices in an attached
"Illustrative List of Export Subsidies" were generally to be considered as subsidies in the sense of article
16(4). See Provisions of Article XVI:4, Nov. 19, 1960, GATT B.I.S.D. (9th Supp.) at 185 (1961). At the
time of the DISC case, this list included the exemption or remission, specifically as related to exports, of
direct taxes.
52. In each instance, the panel ruled that since territorial systems allow part of the income from
export activities to be exempt from domestic tax, these systems constituted partial exemptions from direct
taxes in violation of GATT article 16(4). See Panel Report on Income Tax Practices Maintained by the
Netherlands, Nov. 12, 1976, GATT B.I.S.D. (23d Supp.) at 137 (1977); Panel Report on Income Tax
Practices Maintained by Belgium, Nov. 12, 1976, GATT B.I.S.D. (23d Supp.) at 127 (1977); Panel
Report on Income Tax Practices Maintained by France, Nov. 12, 1976, GATT B.I.S.D. (23d Supp.) at
114(1977).
53. Specifically, the GATT Council adopted the panel reports
on the understanding that with respect to these cases, and in general, economic processes
(including transactions involving exported goods) located outside the territorial limits of the
exporting country, need not be subject to taxation by the exporting country and should not
be regarded as export activities in terms of Article XVI:4 of the General Agreement. It is
further understood that Article XVI:4 requires that arm's length pricing be observed, i.e.,
prices for goods in transactions between exporting enterprises and foreign buyers under
their or the same control should for tax purposes be the prices which would be charged
between independent enterprises acting at arm's length. Furthermore, Article XVI:4 does
not prohibit the adoption of measures to avoid double taxation of foreign source income.
Tax Legislation, Dec. 7-8, 1981, GATT B.I.S.D. (28th Supp.) at 114 (1982).
54. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 801-805, 98 Stat. 494, 985-
1003 (1984) (codified at I.R.C. §§ 921-927 (1994)). This legislation provides that if American
corporations establish foreign subsidiaries that qualify as FSCs, certain income earned by the FSCs will not
be subject to current U.S. tax. On November 18, 1997, the European Union filed a complaint in the World
Trade Organization challenging the FSC legislation. See Joseph Kirwin & Gary G. Yerkey, EU Files
Complaint in WTO Against U.S. Tax Breaks for FSCs, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2044 (Nov. 26, 1997).
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C. The Uruguay Round Controversy About Bringing Income Tax Disputes
Under the Jurisdiction of the GA7T
The Uruguay Round expanded the GATT beyond its original subject of
trade in goods55 to include trade in services. 6 This is significant for interna-
tional tax purposes because trade in services often requires the establishment
of a commercial presence in the importing country. As a result of this local
commercial presence, suppliers of exported services are likely to become
subject to the importing country's income tax laws.' Discriminatory income
taxation of foreign service suppliers therefore could be a significant barrier to
trade in services. Uruguay Round negotiators from many countries sought to
address this issue in the new agreement.
Specifically, extensive negotiations took place over the extent to which
the national treatment obligation of the General Agreement on Trade in Serv-
ices (GATS) should apply to income tax measures.58 This obligation requires
each member country, to the extent articulated in its Schedule of Commit-
ments,59 to treat services and service providers of other members no less fa-
vorably than it treats its own services and service providers.60 The GATS de-
55. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HowsE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE: POLmCAL ECONOMY AND LEGAL ORDER 215 (1995) (noting that pre-Uruguay Round GATT
framework applied only to trade in goods).
56. See GATS, supra note 1, pmbl.
57. Under typical tax treaty rules, countries generally do not impose income taxes on foreign
business enterprises or entrepreneurs unless they establish a commercial presence in the country. See, e.g.,
OECD MODEL TAX CONVENnON, supra note 36, arts. 5 (defining "permanent establishment"), 7
(covering taxation of business profits), 14 (covering taxation of independent personal services).
One should note, however, that the potential for using income tax measures as trade barriers is not
confined to the services context. Trade in goods, particularly the increasingly important categories of
intermediate goods and goods involving intellectual property, also often requires the establishment of a
commercial presence in the importing country. Therefore, trade in goods can also give rise to significant
international income tax concerns.
58. See Frances Williams, Warning to U.S. over Tax Demands, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 24,
1993, at 7 (referring to "two years of laborious negotiations on a tax clause for services"). The GATS
applies to "measures" by members affecting trade in services. See GATS, supra note 1, art. 1(1). A
"measure" includes any law, regulation, rule, procedure, decision, or administrative action. See id. art.
28(a).
59. The GATS is an incomplete agreement, since the members did not agree on a
"comprehensive set of initial specific... commitments." TREBILCOCK & HowsE, supra note 55, at 227-
28. Instead, the GATS contemplates that each member will subsequently agree to undertake specific
commitments with respect to specific sectors of services; this agreement is to be set out in a Schedule of
Commitments. See GATS, supra note 1, art. 20(1) (requiring each member to set out specific
cormitments in a schedule, including terms, limitations, and conditions on market access, and conditions
and qualifications on national treatment).
60. See GATS, supra note 1, art. 17(1). The GATS also contains a "most favored nation"
obligation, which generally requires each member to accord to services and service suppliers of any other
member treatment no less favorable than it accords to like services and service suppliers of any other
country. See id. art. 2(1). The OECD's Model Tax Convention does not impose a most favored nation
obligation, but many bilateral treaties are accompanied by protocols under which the treaty partners
undertake that they will not grant more favorable terms (typically in respect to withholding-tax rates on
dividends, interest, and royalties) to other countries without granting the same concession to the other
treaty partner. See Vann, supra note 34, at 110; see also Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Apr. 8, 1991, Can.-Mex.
(entered into force May 11, 1992), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, IBFDTR File (providing that if
Mexico subsequently agrees in tax treaty with OECD member country to withholding tax on interest or
royalties that is lower than 15%, then such lower rate, which shall not fail below 10%, shall apply for
purposes of the tax treaty between Canada and Mexico).
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fines treatment as "less favorable" if it modifies the conditions of competition
in favor of the member's own services or service suppliers compared to like
services or service suppliers of any other member.61
This national treatment obligation is stricter than the nondiscrimination
obligation imposed by income tax treaties.62 Insofar as the national treatment
obligation were to apply to income tax measures, complaints alleging that a
member country's income tax system discriminates against the services or
service suppliers of another member country would fall under the jurisdiction
of the dispute settlement procedures of the GATT and would be adjudicated
using this stricter standard.
Shortly before the December 15, 1993, deadline for completing the en-
tire Uruguay Round Agreement, the United States announced for the first time
that it considered it unacceptable for the national treatment obligation of the
GATS to apply to income tax measures.63 The United States argued that dis-
criminatory income tax measures are uncommon 4 and that any such measures
can be dealt with adequately through the dispute settlement procedures in in-
come tax treaties.65 In addition, the United States expressed concern that the
61. See GATS, supra note 1, art. 17(3).
62. In particular, the nondiscrimination article in the OECD MODEL TAx CONVENTION, supra
note 36, art. 24, a comprehensive tax treaty nondiscrimination article, prohibits a host country from im-
posing discriminatory taxes on a business enterprise operating within its territory that is carried on, owned,
or controlled by residents of the other treaty country, but it does not prohibit the host country from impo s-
ing discriminatory taxes on the nonresident investors in such an enterprise: Although article 24(1) prohibits
a treaty country from imposing discriminatory taxation on nationals of the other treaty country "in the same
circumstances," id. art. 24(1), a nonresident taxpayer is not considered to be "in the same circumstances"
as a resident taxpayer. See FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJEcr, supra note 26, at 262. Therefore, article 24(1)
does not prohibit discriminatory taxation of nonresident investors. The other clauses of article 24 also fail
to prohibit such discrimination. See id. A common example of discrimination against nonresident investors
occurs when a source country integrates its corporate and individual income tax systems by giving share-
holders a credit against their individual tax liability for the corporate taxes that were paid on distributed
earnings. Countries typically do not extend the benefits of such integration systems to nonresident share-
holders. Although this treatment of nonresident investors is discriminatory, it does not violate the nondi s-
crimination article of income tax treaties. See id. at 186-90, 264-65; U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAsuRY, supra
note 42, at 79 (noting that "[n]o treaty requires that foreign shareholders receive the same tax credits as
domestic shareholders"). This treatment of nonresident investors does modify the conditions of competition
in favor of domestic enterprises, however, and thus presumably would violate the national treatment obl i-
gation of the GATS.
63. See David Dodwell, GATT Clash over US Tax Is Defused, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 11,
1993, at 3 [hereinafter Dodwell, GATT Clash over US Tax Is Defused] (reporting on settlement of dispute);
David Dodwell, US Blocks International Fair Tax Plan, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 28, 1993, at 7
[hereinafter Dodwell, US Blocks International Fair Tax Plan] (reporting on initial American opt-out);
David Dodwell, US Fights Its Corner over Tax Demands, FIN. TImES (London), Nov. 23, 1993, at 6
[hereinafter Dodwell, US Fights Its Corner over Tax Demands] (describing U.S. objections); Williams,
supra note 58, at 7 (reporting on dispute).
64. See Bob Davis & Julie Wolf, U.S., EC Believe Deal Is in Sight on World Trade, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 3, 1993, at A3 (describing U.S. opposition to draft tax proposal); Asra Q. Nomani & Bhushan
Bahree, GATr Teams Push Final Efforts to Set Global Trade Pact as Deadline Looms, WALL ST. J., Dec.
9, 1993, at A3 (noting other negotiators' frustration with U.S. demands); U.S. to Continue Efforts to
Exclude Taxes from GAYT Talks on Services, Samuels Says, 1993 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 231 (Dec. 3,
1993), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, DTR File, 1993 DTR 231 d12 ") [hereinafter U.S. to
Continue Efforts] (describing American objections to tax measures and noting statement of U.S. Assistant
Secretary of Treasury for Tax Policy that "if you ask about direct tax measures that are disguised trade
barriers, no one comes up with an example.
65. See GATT Director Opposes U.S. Position on Taxation of Services in Trade Talks, 1993
Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 225 (Nov. 24, 1993), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, DTR File, 1993
DTR 225 d6 [hereinafter GATTDirector Opposes U.S. Position]; U.S. to Continue Efforts, supra note 64.
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application of the GATS to income tax measures "would upset the existing
system of bilateral tax treaties, and could tie the hands of Congress in enacting
new tax laws."6
Every other country participating in the negotiations reportedly opposed
the United States's eleventh-hour position.67 The other countries believed that
it was necessary that the GATS include additional protection against discrimi-
natory tax measures.68 Some countries apparently suspected that the United
States wanted to carve income tax measures out of the national treatment obli-
gation because it intended to pursue discriminatory tax policies, particularly in
the area of transfer pricing regulation. 69 This conflict threatened to scuttle not
only the negotiations on services but the entire Uruguay Round.70
In the end, the United States abandoned its extreme position and agreed
to the inclusion in the GATS of language bringing income tax measures under
the national treatment obligation.7' The final language is very limited, how-
ever. Article 14(d) creates an exception to the national treatment obligation of
the GATS for measures in which "the difference in treatment is aimed at en-
suring the equitable or effective imposition or collection of direct taxes in re-
spect of services or service suppliers of other Members."'72 "Direct taxes" for
this purpose include all taxes on income or capital.7' A footnote to this provi-
sion lists broad categories of discriminatory income tax measures that will not
be considered to violate the national treatment obligation.74
66. Williams, supra note 58, at 7; see also Dodwell, GAT Clash over US Tax Is Defused,
supra note 63, at 3; Dodwell, US Fights Its Corner over Tax Demands, supra note 63, at 6.
67. The Director of the GATT reportedly told the U.S. Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for
Tax Policy on November 23, 1993, that all of the other 114 nations involved in the talks opposed the U.S.
position that tax measures should be carved out of the GATS. See Davis & Wolf, supra note 64, at A3
(noting that U.S. position on discriminatory income tax measures "has escalated into a high-profile dispute
between the Europeans and the U.S., which is raising it without much visible support from other
countries"); GATTDirector Opposes U.S. Position, supra note 65; Nomani & Bahree, supra note 64, at
A3 (noting that United States had fhiled to convince key negotiators, particularly those from European
countries, that discriminatory income tax measures would not be used as trade barriers); Williams, supra
note 58. These other countries were concerned that taxes might be used as a disguised barrier to trade in
services; they also believed that the GATS was the appropriate place to address this issue and that it was
necessary to have the extra protection that would result from including tax measures under the GATS. See
Davis & Wolf, supra note 64, at A3; GAYT Director Opposes U.S. Position, supra note 65; U.S. to
Continue Efforts, supra note 64. The U.S. Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy noted,
however, that the tax authorities of some other countries had expressed sympathy with the U.S. position
but had been asked by trade negotiators to play a subordinate role. See id.
68. See Davis & Wolf, supra note 64, at A3 ("The U.S. argues that it wouldn't use tax laws to
inhibit trade, but other countries contend that such a pledge isn't enough and that extra protection needs to
be included in the world trade agreement."); Nomani & Bahree, supra note 64, at A3 ("The U.S. insists
the U.S. proposal wouldn't be used as a trade barrier, but it hasn't yet convinced key negotiators,
particularly from European countries."); U.S. to Continue Efforts, supra note 64 ("[W]hen the United
States strenuously objected to the draft carve-out, some countries suspected [that] the United States opposed
national treatment because it wanted to pursue discriminatory tax policies .... ").
69. See U.S. to Continue Efforts, supra note 64; Williams, supra note 58, at 7.
70. See GATTDirector Opposes U.S. Position, supra note 65; Williams, supra note 58, at 7.
71. See Bob Davis & Asra Q. Nomani, Officials Closer to Completing a Trade Accord, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 14, 1993, at A3; Dodwell, GA2T Clash over US Tax Is Defused, supra note 63, at 3.
72. GATS, supra note 1, art. 14(d) (footnote omitted).
73. See id. art. 28(o).
74. See id. art. 14(d) n.6. These exceptions include, among others, measures that "apply to non-
resident service suppliers in recognition of the fact that the tax obligation of non-residents is determined
with respect to taxable items sourced or located in the Member's territory"; measures that "apply to non-
residents in order to ensure the imposition or collection of taxes in the Member's territory"; measures that
"apply to non-residents or residents in order to prevent the avoidance or evasion of taxes, including
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On the other hand, article 14 contains a general proviso that measures-
including income tax measures-may not be "applied in a manner which
would constitute... a disguised restriction on trade in services."'I Under this
language, a GATT panel with jurisdiction over an income tax measure might
use a least restrictive alternative or balancing test to conclude that the measure
constitutes a "disguised restriction on trade in services" and therefore violates
the national treatment obligation, even though, on its face, it falls under the
article 14(d) exception for direct taxes.
Having created this risk, however, the GATS then virtually eliminates it
as a practical matter by severely limiting the jurisdiction of GATT panels over
income tax measures. Article 22(3) of the GATS provides that a member may
not invoke the GATT dispute settlement procedures to challenge another
member's income tax measure as violating the national treatment obligation of
article 17 whenever the measure falls within the scope of an income tax treaty
between the two countries.76 If the members disagree about whether the in-
come tax measure in question falls within the scope of an income tax treaty,
either member may bring the matter before the Council for Trade in Services,
which must refer the matter to final and binding arbitration.77 With respect to
income tax treaties that were in force on January 1, 1995, however, such a
matter may be brought before the Council for Trade in Services only with the
consent of both parties to the tax treaty.7"
This leaves only the risk that disputes about income tax measures that
fall within the scope of income tax treaties that come into force after January
1, 1995, might become subject to the GATS dispute settlement procedures
without consent. Countries can eliminate this risk, too, by including language
in these income tax treaties that preempts the language of article -22(3) of the
GATS, and, indeed, they have begun to do so.79
compliance measures"; and measures that "determine, allocate or apportion income, profit, gain, loss,
deduction or credit of resident persons or branches, or between related persons or branches of the same
person, in order to safeguard the Member's tax base." Id.
75. Id. art. 14.
76. See id. art. 22(3); see also OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 36, art. 25
commentary, paras. 44.1-.7, at c(25)-15 to c(25)-17 (discussing interaction of mutual agreement procedure
of OECD's Model Tar Convention with dispute resolution mechanism provided by GATS).
77. See GATS, supra note 1, art. 22(3).
78. See id. art. 22(3) n.11. In addition, article 14(e) allows exceptions to the most favored nation
treatment otherwise required by the GATS, provided that the difference in treatment is the result of an
income tax treaty. See id. art. 14(e).
79. The OECD's commentary on article 25 of the OECD's Model Tar Convention suggests that
this preemption be accomplished by adding the following provision in new income tax treaties:
For purposes of paragraph 3 of Article XXII (Consultation) of the General Agreement on
Trade in Services, the Contracting States agree that, notwithstanding that paragraph, any
dispute between them as to whether a measure falls within the scope of this Convention may
be brought before the Council for Trade in Services, as provided by that paragraph, only
with the consent of both Contracting States. Any doubt as to the interpretation of this para-
graph shall be resolved under paragraph 3 of Article 25 (Mutual Agreement Procedure) or,
failing agreement under that procedure, pursuant to any other procedure agreed to by both
Contracting States.
OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 36, art. 25 commentary, para. 44.6, at c(25)-16 to c(25)-17.
The income tax treaty between the United States and France adopts such an approach, providing in
part:
Notwithstanding any other agreement to which the Contracting States may be parties, a dis-
pute concerning whether a measure is within the scope of this Convention shall be consid-
ered only by the competent authorities of the Contracting States, as defined in subparagraph
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Subsequent to this experience in the Uruguay Round, the issue of mak-
ing international tax dispute settlement more legalistic-either by modifying
tax treaties or by including income tax measures in trade or investment agree-
ments-has resurfaced several times. For example, a recent report of the Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Committee
on Fiscal Affairs remarks on the similarities between the problems of inter-
governmental dispute settlement under tax treaties and trade agreements 0 and
suggests that it might be desirable to reconsider the design of tax treaty dis-
pute settlement mechanisms in light of the GATT's "increasingly sophisticated
procedures and institutions to resolve international trade disputes."81 More re-
cently, member countries of the OECD negotiating a Multilateral Agreement
on Investment (MA) formed an experts' group to determine the extent to
which tax-related provisions should be included in an eventual agreement.82
As they did in the Uruguay Round, U.S. officials have taken the position that
income taxes should be carved out of the MAI, arguing that the bilateral tax
treaty network is adequate to deal with income tax issues affecting investment
and that the mutual agreement provisions of tax treaties are the optimal way to
resolve income tax disputes."
1(h) of Article 3 (General Definitions) of this Convention, and the procedures under this
Convention exclusively shall apply with respect to the dispute.
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to
Taxes on Income and Capital, Aug. 31, 1994, U.S.-Fr., art. 29(8)(a), S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-32, at 73
(1994) [hereinafter U.S.-France Treaty]. Similar provisions appear in the United States's income tax
treaties with Kazakhstan, Portugal, and Sweden. See Exchange of Diplomatic Notes Accompanying the
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to
Taxes on Income and Capital, July 10, 1995, U.S.-Kaz., reprinted in 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 5311-
5312, at 34,419-3 to 34,420 (1995); Protocol to the Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Sept. 6, 1994, U.S.-Port.,
para. l(a)(ii), S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-34, at 59 (1994); Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Sept. 1, 1994, U.S.-
Swed., art. 1(3)(a), S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-29, at 2 (1994).
80. See OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES, supra note 2, paras. 4.167-.168, at IV-53 to
IV-54.
81. Id.; see also id. para. 4.171, at IV-55. In contrast, in a report issued in 1984, the OECD
Committee on Fiscal Affairs specifically chose not to recommend the adoption of compulsory arbitration
procedures to supersede or supplement the mutual agreement procedure. See ORGANISATION FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION & DEv., TRANSFER PRICING AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: THREE TAXATION ISSUES
para. 63, at25 (1984) [hereinafter OECD, TRANSFER PRICING AND MULTnATIONAL ENTERPRisES].
82. See OECD Investment Negotiators Form Group to Examine Tax Issues, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
Feb. 2, 1996, at 24; see also Robert Couzin, Taxation and the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 12
Tax Notes Int'l (rax Analysts) 2049 (June 24, 1996). Couzin notes that a "colorable tax measure may be
used to effect an expropriation, to establish a performance requirement, to block the repatriation of profits,
or to discriminate in almost any other way against foreign investors in general (defeating national
treatment), or even against foreign investors from certain countries (defeating MFN status)." Id. at 2051.
Note that article 13 of the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty carves out taxation, except for
certain matters relating to expropriation. See Pamela B. Gann, The U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty
Program, 21 STAN. J. INT'L L. 373, 426-27 (1985) (discussing relationship between tax treaties and tax
provisions in bilateral investment treaties and treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation). The
NAFTA also carves out most direct taxation issues, except for expropriation and some performance
requirements. See NAFTA, supra note 36, art. 2103. For more on this issue, see Malcolm Gamnie, The
Taxation of Inward Direct Investment in North America Following the Free Trade Agreement, 49 TAX L.
REv. 615, 622-23 (1994).
83. See Albertina M. Fern~ndez & Susan M. Lyons, The Transatlantic Tax Outlook: European
and U.S. Tax Relations, 12 Tax Notes Int'l (Tax Analysts) 1923, 1925 (June 17, 1996) (reporting such
remarks of Joseph Guttentag, International Tax Counsel, U.S. Department of the Treasury, at transatlantic
tax conference held June 4, 1996); OECD Investment Negotiators Form Group to Examine Tax Issues,
supra note 82, at 24 (1996) (quoting unnamed "senior Administration official" on similar matters).
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III. ANTILEGALISTIC DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER INCOME TAX TREATIES
Part II described the legalistic dispute settlement system that has evolved
under the GATT and argued that there is a close relationship between interna-
tional tax policy and international trade policy. Nevertheless, a widely sup-
ported proposal to bring disputes about discriminatory income tax measures
under the jurisdiction of the GATT dispute settlement system was largely de-
feated by the United States during the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.
Under the final agreement, the tax treaty dispute settlement mechanism will
have exclusive jurisdiction when a tax treaty is applicable to an income tax
dispute.
This Part of the Article shows that dispute settlement mechanisms under
income tax treaties are highly "antilegalistic." These mechanisms attempt to
resolve relatively fact-specific disputes through consultation and negotiation
between designated tax officials from the relevant countries. Even this infor-
mal, nonbinding approach was never really intended to apply, however, to
disputes that involve policy-level conflicts between domestic law and tax
treaty obligations. Instead, such disputes realistically can be settled, if at all,
only through diplomatic channels.
More specifically, income tax treaties typically contain a dispute settle-
ment procedure similar to the "mutual agreement procedure" of article 25 of
the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital. Article 25
places dispute settlement in the hands of a tax official in each treaty country
who is designated to be that country's "competent authority. "84 The competent
authority's functions are set forth in three clauses of article 25, commonly
known as the "specific case" provision, the "interpretative" provision, and the
"legislative" provision.
85
The specific case provision requires each competent authority to "en-
deavor" to resolve specific disputes in which taxpayers assert that they are not
being taxed in accordance with the treaty.86 A competent authority may re-
solve a specific dispute unilaterally, or he or she may seek settlement through
Guttentag conceded, however, that taxes used for expropriatory purposes should be covered by the MAI.
See Ferndndez & Lyons, supra, at 1925.
84. See OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 36, art. 25. The United States's income
tax treaties designate the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate as the U.S. competent authority. See
U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION, art. 3(1)(e)(i) (Sept. 20, 1996),
reprinted in 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 214, at 10,587 (1996), available at
<http://ftp.fedworld.gov/pub/telltOtxmodl.doc> (visited Dec. 5, 1997) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF ThE
TREASURY, MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION]. The Secretary of the Treasury has delegated this authority
to the IRS Assistant Commissioner (International). In the case of treaty interpretation, he or she acts with
the concurrence of the Associate Chief Counsel (Technical and International). See Deleg. Order No. 114
(Rev. 9), 1990-33 I.R.B. 326.
85. See FEDERAL INCOME TAX PRoJECT, supra note 26, at 94-112; John F. Avery Jones et al.,
The Legal Nature of the Mutual Agreement Procedure Under the OECD Model Convention (pt. 2), 1980
BRIT. TAX REv. 13, 18-20.
86. See OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 36, art. 25(2). See generally FEDERAL
INCOME TAX PROJECT, supra note 26, at 99-111 (discussing "specific case" provision). Although the
taxpayer has the right to submit a request to initiate a mutual agreement procedure, the taxpayer has no
specific right to participate in the process. See OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDEUNES, supra note 2,
para. 4.57, at IV-19. In practice, however, the tax administrations of many OECD member countries
routinely give taxpayers opportunities to present relevant facts and arguments, keep them informed of the
progress of the discussions, and often ask during the course of the discussions whether they can accept the
settlements contemplated by the competent authorities. See id. para.4.60, at IV-20.
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mutual agreement with the competent authority of the other treaty country.
The interpretative provision requires the competent authorities to "endeavor"
to resolve questions of treaty "interpretation or application" by mutual agree-
ment.' Finally, the legislative provision authorizes the competent authorities
to "consult together for the elimination of double taxation in cases not pro-
vided for in the Convention. "88
In analyzing this competent authority system, it is useful to distinguish
between two types of intergovernmental tax disputes. One type is fact-
specific; the other raises issues of policy-level conflicts between domestic law
and treaty obligations. Consider first the case of a fact-specific dispute. In
such a dispute, the treaty partners would agree in principle on the applicable
treaty rules and would intend to comply with those rules but would reach dif-
ferent results in the context of the specific set of facts.8 9 The classic example
would be a transfer pricing dispute, involving the allocation of profits between
a parent corporation and its subsidiary in another country or between a corpo-
ration's home office and a branch located abroad.
Suppose, for example, that a Japanese manufacturing corporation estab-
lishes a wholly owned U.S. subsidiary to distribute its products in the United
States. Suppose further that it manufactures goods for $50 and sells them to its
87. OECD MODELTAX CONVENTION, supra note 36, art. 25(3).
88. Id. Although the scope of this legislative authority is unclear, there are indications that the
U.S. Congress, at least, intends it to be very narrow. For example, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee's report on the U.S.-Malta tax treaty describes the scope of the legislative provision as follows:
It permits the competent authorities to deal with cases that are within the spirit and sense of
the provisions but which are not specifically covered. Thus, the authority delegated should
be construed as analogous to a grant of broad regulatory authority to deal with problems
that may arise as distinguished from a grant of legislative authority. It might, for example,
be compared to the regulatory authority granted to the Secretary of the Treasury under sec-
tion 385 or section 482. The provision is not intended to authorize the competent authorities
to deal with problems of major policy significance that normally would be the subject of
negotiations if they had been focused on during that process.
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., TAX CONVENTION wrrH TEE REPUBLiC OF MALTA, S. EXEC. REP.
No. 97-30, at 27 (1981), reprinted in 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 5845, at 35,568 (1990). The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee's report on the U.S.-Argentina tax treaty contains similar language. See S. ExEc.
REP. No. 97-44, at 30 (1981).
Similarly, Representative Dan Rostenkowski, then Chairman of the House Committee on
Ways and Means, testified in hearings held in 1981 that "the scope of this delegation of authority [in the
legislative provision] must be clarified and limited to include only noncontroversial technical matters, not
items of substance." Tax Treaties: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Tax
Treaties, 97th Cong. 58 (1981).
Notwithstanding this restrictive language, the U.S. and Canadian competent authorities engaged in
an expansive exercise of legislative authority in negotiating an agreement covering Canadian taxation of
offshore drillers. See Letter from J.R. Robertson, Director-General Audit Directorate, to P.E. Coates,
Assistant Commissioner (Operations) (IRS) (Jan. 26, 1984), reprinted in 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 1945, at
21,041-43 (1997). For discussions of this agreement, see FEDERAL INcoME TAX PROJEcT, supra note 26,
at 112 & n.343; and Russell K. Osgood, Interpreting Tax Treaties in Canada, the United States, and the
United Kingdom, 17 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 255, 267-68 (1984).
89. For example, in Boulez v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 584 (1984), Pierre Boulez, a French
citizen and German resident, contracted with CBS Records to make recordings of orchestral works in the
United States. The contract provided that Boulez would be paid a percentage of sales revenues. The
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) characterized this income as compensation for personal services performed
in the United States, which was taxable by the United States. The German tax administration, however,
characterized the income as "royalties," which were taxable exclusively by Germany under the tax treaty
then in effect between the United States and Germany. See id. at 588. Boulez requested that the two coun-
tries institute dispute settlement proceedings under the treaty to resolve this conflict and eliminate the
double taxation. The countries were unable, however, to reach an agreement. See id.
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U.S. subsidiary for $80. The U.S. subsidiary then sells the goods to unrelated
U.S. customers for $100. Under these facts, the Japanese corporation would
report $30 in profits to the Japanese tax authority, and the U.S. subsidiary
would report $20 in profits to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The IRS,
however, might argue that the two related corporations set the transfer price
of $80 at an artificially high level. Suppose the IRS asserted that the proper
transfer price was $70. This would mean that the Japanese corporation re-
ported $10 too much in profits to the Japanese tax authority, and the U.S. sub-
sidiary reported $10 too little in profits to the IRS. Therefore, the Japanese
corporation should get a tax refund from Japan, and the U.S. subsidiary
should pay additional taxes to the IRS. The Japanese tax authority might well
disagree with the IRS's position, however, giving rise to a dispute between the
two governments. The governments almost certainly would agree that the ap-
plicable standard was the treaty's arm's length standard.' Under this standard,
the proper transfer price is the price that two unrelated corporations dealing at
arm's length with one another would have used had they engaged in the same
transaction. The governments also likely would agree in principle on what the
arm's length standard means. Nevertheless, they might use different methods
or consider different data in applying the arm's length standard and therefore
might reach different numerical results.
At some point, a disagreement over transfer pricing methodology could
rise to the level of a fundamental disagreement in principle. The United
States, in particular, has adopted several controversial interpretations of the
arm's length standard. 9 The run-of-the-mill transfer pricing case, however, is
90. See, e.g., OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 36, arts. 7(2) (providing that
income attributed to permanent establishment should reflect "the profits which it might be expected to
make if it were a distinct and separate enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities under the same
or similar conditions and dealing wholly independently with the enterprise of which it is a permanent
establishment"), 9 (providing that income attributed to enterprise that engages in transactions with other
commonly controlled enterprises should reflect profits that it would have earned if those transactions had
been made between "independent enterprises").
91. See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1231(e)(1), 100 Stat. 2085,
2562-63 (1986) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 482 (1994)) (amending I.R.C. § 482 to require that income that
taxpayer derives from transfer of intangible property to related party be "commensurate with the income
attributable to the intangible"). The Joint Committee on Taxation's explanation of the Act states that
Congress intended that the IRS should not determine arm's length transfer prices for intangibles (which
typically take the form of royalties) solely on the basis of profit expectations at the time of the transfer, but
rather should also take into account the level of actual profits earned after the transfer. See STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, 100m CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATON OF THE TAX REFoRm Acr OF 1986, at 1016
(Comm. Print 1987); cf OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES, supra note 2, paras. 1.36-.41, at 1-15 to
1-17, paras. 6.32-.34, at VI-12 to VI-13 (discussing limited circumstances in which tax administrations
may take subsequent developments, such as actual profits in excess of anticipated profits, into account in
determining arm's length prices).
Furthermore, in the final Treasury regulations under section 482, adopted in 1994, the U.S.
Treasury Department prescribed a "comparable profits method" under which arm's length prices are
determined by comparing the profits of a controlled corporation to the profits of comparable uncontrolled
corporations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5(a) (as amended in 1995). Again, many treaty partners have argued
that such methods conflict with the arm's length standard. The OECD's Transfer Pricing Guidelines
prescribe a similar, but not identical, method, called the "transactional net margin method," which
compares the profits that result from particular transactions of a controlled corporation to the profits that
arise from comparable transactions between uncontrolled corporations. See OECD TRANSFER PRICING
GuiEUNFS, supra note 2, paras. 3.26-.48, at 111-9 to HI-16 (defining "transactional net margin method"
as method that "examines the net profit margin relative to an appropriate base (e.g., costs, sales, assets)
that a taxpayer realizes from a controlled transaction (or transactions that are appropriate to aggregate
under the principles of Chapter 1)"). The final Treasury regulations and the OECD's Transfer Pricing
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likely to turn on the application of an agreed-upon methodology to a specific
set of facts.
It is widely recognized that the competent authority procedure is a weak
mechanism for resolving such fact-specific disputes.' The treaty countries
promise merely to "endeavor" to resolve disputes;' there is no guarantee that
they will succeed. 4 Moreover, it is widely perceived that when treaty coun-
tries do manage to resolve disputes, the settlement is often based on political
negotiation and compromise rather than on the neutral application of legal
rules to the facts of the specific case.95
One solution would be to strengthen the competent authority procedure
by including an arbitration provision.96 Countries recently have begun to ex-
periment with this approach. The European Union's Convention on the Elimi-
nation of Double Taxation in Connection with the Adjustment of Profits of
Guidelines were published almost simultaneously, suggesting that they might have been developed in
tandem.
92. See, e.g., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECr, supra note 26, at 107; PHIJ BAKER, DOUBLE
TAXATION AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL TAX LAw 332-35 (1991); GUSTAF LINDENCRONA & NiLs
MATrSSON, ARBITRATION IN TAXATION 25 (1981); Avery Jones et al., supra note 85, at 18-20; Lotfi
Maktouf, Resolving International Tax Disputes Through Arbitration, 4 ARB. INT'L 32, 41 (1988).
93. OECD MODELTAX CONVENTION, supra note 36, art. 25(2); id. art. 25(3).
94. See OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 36, art. 25 commentary, paras. 26, at
C(25)-9, 45, at C(25)-17 (1995) (noting that mutual agreement procedure does not assure resolution of
disputes); FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, supra note 26, at 101, 107 (same); LINDENCRONA &
MATrSSON, supra note 92, at 25 (same); Maktouf, supra note 92, at 41 (same). The Boulez case is a good
example of a case in which the competent authorities failed to reach agreement. See supra note 89 and
accompanying text (discussing Boulez v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 584 (1984)).
95. See OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES, supra note 2, para. 4.41, at IV-14 (noting that
"[t]axpayers have expressed fears that their cases may be settled not on their individual merits but by
reference to a balance of the results in other cases"); FEDERAL INCOME TAX PRoJEcr, supra note 26, at
107 (stating that "the competent authorities may inevitably engage in a certain amount of bargaining or
trading-off among cases not based on their individual merits"); LINDENCRONA & MATrSSON, supra note
92, at 25 (noting that there is no guarantee that competent authorities will follow any "fundamental legal
principles in international tax law" in reaching agreement); John Iekel, U.S. Transfer Pricing Regime
Roundly Disliked, Informal Survey Finds, 10 Tax Notes Int'l (Tax Analysts) 36 (Jan. 2, 1995) (describing
competent authority process as "good old-fashioned horse trading" without regard to individual taxpayers'
cases); Maktouf, supra note 92, at 41 (noting that "[a]n overall agreement may often be reached,
irrespective of the merits of each particular case").
96. See FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJEC, supra note 26, at 110-11 (endorsing use of
supplemental dispute resolution procedures, including "voluntary" procedure for binding arbitration);
LINDENCRONA & MATrsSON, supra note 92, at 59-88 (proposing arbitration of tax treaty disputes in cases
where the competent authorities fail to reach agreement); Maktouf, supra note 92, at 42-49 (concluding
that arbitration could complement mutual agreement procedure). See generally INTERNATIONAL FISCAL
ASS'N, RESOLUTION OF TAX TREATY CONFCTS BY ARBITRATION (1994).
The commentary on article 25 of the OECD's Model Tax Convention discusses the use of advisory
opinions from an impartial third party, submission of questions to the Committee on Fiscal Affairs, and
arbitration as alternative methods of resolving disputes. See OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note
36, art. 25 commentary, paras. 45-48, at C(25)-17 to C(25)-28.
The OECD's 1984 report on transfer pricing discussed some of the advantages and disadvantages
of arbitration, concluding that "for the time being" it was not appropriate to recommend a mandatory
arbitration procedure. See OECD, TRANSFER PRICING AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 81,
para. 63, at 25. The OECD's 1995 Transfer Pricing Guidelines conclude, however, that in light of
developments since 1984,
it seems appropriate to analyze again and in more detail whether the introduction of a tax
arbitration procedure would be an appropriate addition to international tax relations. There-
fore, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs has agreed to undertake a study of this topic and to
supplement these Guidelines with the conclusions of that study when it is completed.
OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUiDELInES, supra note 2, para. 4.171, at IV-55.
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Associated Enterprises, 7 which entered into force on January 1, 1995,98 pro-
vides for arbitration of transfer pricing disputes between European Union
(EU) member states.99 Similarly, Germany's bilateral tax treaties with France
and Sweden permit the competent authorities to submit a dispute to arbitra-
tion.00
In addition, the United States has negotiated arbitration clauses in its in-
come tax treaties with Canada,' 01 France,"°2 Germany, °" Kazakhstan,104 Mex-
ico, 15 and the Netherlands,1"6 as well as in a proposed income tax treaty with
Switzerland." ° These clauses represent timid steps, however, and only the
German provision currently is in force.' The arbitration provisions in the
97. Convention on the Elimination of Double Taxation in Connection with the Adjustment of
Profits of Associated Enterprises, Aug. 20, 1990, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 10 [hereinafter EU Arbitration Con-
vention].
98. See Luc Hinnekens, The European Tar Arbitration Convention and Its Legal Framevork (pt.
1), 1996 BRrr. TAX REv. 132, 132. The EU Arbitration Convention is concluded for a period of five
years. See EU Arbitration Convention, supra note 97, art. 20. Six months before the expiration of that
period, the contracting states are to meet to decide whether to extend the Convention. See id.
99. See EU Arbitration Convention, supra note 97, arts. 6-14. For a general discussion of this
issue, see Luc Hinnekens, The European Ta Arbitration Convention and Its Legal Framework (pt. 2),
1996 BRrr. TAx REv. 272, 272; and Franz-Josef Kolb, Pros and Cons of the EC Arbitration Convention,
13 Tax Notes Int'l (Tax Analysts) 241 (July 22, 1996).
100. See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to the Taxes on Income
and Capital as Well as on Inheritances, F.R.G.-Swed., art. 41.3 (entered into force Oct. 13, 1994),
available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, IBFDTR File (unofficial translation); Amending Protocol to the
Convention of 21 July 1959 for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Sept. 28, 1989, F.R.G.-Fr., art. 7
(entered into force Oct. 1, 1990) (adding art. 25A to treaty), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, IBFDTR
File (unofficial translation). For discussions of the arbitration provision in the treaty between Germany and
Sweden, see Leif Mut~n, New German-Sweden Tax Convention Examined, 5 Tax Notes Int'l (Tax
Analysts) 531, 535 (Sept. 14, 1992); and Joseph H. Guttentag & Ann E. Misback, Resolving Tax Treaty
Issues: A Novel Solution, 40 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 350 (1986).
101. See Revised Protocol Amending the 1980 Tax Convention, Apr. 24, 1995, U.S.-Can., S.
TREATY Doc. No. 104-4 (1995) [hereinafter U.S.-Canada Protocol]. Article 14(2) of this Protocol adds a
new paragraph 6 to article 26 (Mutual Agreement Procedure), providing for voluntary binding arbitration
of income tax disputes that the competent authorities are unable to resolve by agreement. See id. art. 14(2),
at 13-14.
102. See U.S.-France Treaty, supra note 79, art. 26(5), at 66.
103. See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital and to Certain Other Taxes, Aug. 29, 1989, U.S.-F.R.G.,
art. 25(5), S. TREATY Doc. No. 101-10, at 69 (1990) (entered into force Aug. 21, 1991) [hereinafter U.S.-
Germany Treaty].
104. See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, Oct. 24, 1993, U.S.-Kaz., art. 25(5), S. TREATY Doc. No.
103-33, at 42 (1994) (entered into force Dec. 30, 1996) [hereinafter U.S.-Kazakhstan Treaty].
105. See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Taxes on Income, Sept. 18, 1992, U.S.-Mex., art. 26(5), S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-7, at
52 (1993) (entered into force Dec. 28, 1993) [hereinafter U.S.-Mexico Treaty].
106. See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Taxes on Income, Dec. 18, 1992, U.S.-Neth., art. 29(5), S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-6, at
90 (1993) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter U.S.-Netherlands Treaty].
107. See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income,
Oct. 2, 1996, U.S.-Switz., art. 25(6), reprinted in 3 Tax Treaties (CCH) 9101.25, at 42,005-16 (1996)
(not yet in force) [hereinafter U.S.-Switzerland Treaty].
108. An exchange of diplomatic notes accompanying the U.S.-Germany treaty provides rules for
arbitration. See Letter from Vernon Waters, Ambassador of the United States of America to the Federal
Republic of Germany, to German Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Aug. 29, 1989), in U.S.-Germany Treaty,
supra note 103, at 13-15 [hereinafter Diplomatic Note]. These rules provide for the establishment of an
arbitration board of at least three members that will be instructed by the competent authorities regarding
specific rules of procedure. Otherwise, the board will establish its own rules of procedure. See id. para. 3,
at 14. The arbitration board is to decide each specific case on the basis of the treaty and to render a written
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other U.S. treaties will come into force only through a future exchange of
diplomatic notes." 9 In the case of the United States-Mexico treaty, a protocol
provides that the competent authorities will meet three years after the treaty
enters into force to determine whether such an exchange is appropriate. 0 The
Treasury Department's technical explanation of the United States-Mexico
treaty states that one of the key factors for the U.S. competent authority in
making that determination will be the U.S. experience under the arbitration
provision of the United States-Germany treaty."' An Understanding relating
to the United States-Netherlands treaty"' and the U.S. legislative history of
the treaties with Canada,"' France," 4 and Kazakhstan5 contain similar lan-
guage.
Arbitration under these U.S. treaties will be voluntary, occurring only
when both governments and the affected taxpayer agree to submit the case and
to be bound by the award." 6 The United States, Germany, Mexico, and the
Netherlands have further stipulated that they generally will not agree to arbi-
trate matters concerning "tax policy" or "domestic tax law."17 The U.S. leg-
decision. See id. para. 5, at 14.
109. See U.S.-Switzerland Treaty, supra note 107, art. 25(6), at 42,005-16; U.S.-Canada
Protocol, supra note 101, art. 14(2), at 13; U.S.-France Treaty, supra note 79, art. 26(5), at 66; U.S.-
Kazakhstan Treaty, supra note 104, art. 25(5), at 42; U.S.-Netherlands Treaty, supra note 106, art. 29(5),
at 90; U.S.-Mexico Treaty, supra note 105, art. 26(5), at 52.
110. See U.S.-Mexico Treaty, supra note 105, protocol, par. 18(a), at 67.
111. See Treasury Department Technical Explanation of the Convention and Protocol Between
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Mexican States for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income
Signed at Washington on September 18, 1992, reprinted in 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 5943, at 35,829-37
(1994).
112. See Understanding Regarding the Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Dec. 18, 1992, U.S.-Neth., art. 27(A), S.
TREATY Doc. No. 103-6, at XVII to XVIII (1993) [hereinafter U.S.-Netherlands Memorandum of
Understanding].
113. See S. ExEc. REP. No. 104-9, at 46 (1995); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXAnTON,
104TH CONG., EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED PROTOCOL TO THE INcOmE TAX TREATY BETwEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA 44 (Comm. Print 1995).
114. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED
INCOME TAX TREATY BErhTEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE FRENCH REPUBLIC 25 (Comm. Print 1995);
Treasury Department Technical Explanation of the Convention Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the French Republic for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Signed at Paris on August
31, 1994, reprinted in 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 3058, at 27,197-41 (1995) [hereinafter Technical
Explanation].
115. See Treasury Department Technical Explanation of the Convention and Protocol Between
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and
Capital Signed at Almaty on October 24, 1993, reprinted in 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 5348, at 34,421-30
(1995) [hereinafter U.S.-Kazakhstan Technical Explanation].
116. See U.S.-Switzerland Treaty, supra note 107, art. 25(6), at 42,005-16; U.S.-Canada
Protocol, supra note 101, art. 14(2), at 13; U.S.-France Treaty, supra note 79, art. 26(5), at 66; U.S.-
Kazakhstan Treaty, supra note 104, art. 25(5), at 42; U.S.-Mexico Treaty, supra note 105, art. 26(5), at
52; U.S.-Netherlands Treaty, supra note 106, art. 29(5), at 90; U.S.-Germany Treaty, supra note 103, art.
25(5), at 69; Diplomatic Note, supra note 108, at 13.
117. These agreements state that "[tihe competent authorities will not generally accede to arbitra-
tion with respect to matters concerning the tax policy or domestic tax law of either Contracting State."
U.S.-Netherlands Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 112, para. 27(A)(1), at XVIII; U.S.-Mexico
Treaty, supra note 105, protocol, para. 18(b)(i), at 67; Diplomatic Note, supra note 108, at 13. The
relevant language is the same in each treaty, although the Mexican version does not include the words
"generally" and "contracting," and the Dutch version omits the word "contracting."
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islative history of the treaties with Canada, u1  France, n 9 and Kazakhstan'
also suggests that arbitration under these tax treaties likely will be confined to
fact-specific disputes."'
The use of arbitration or some other legalistic dispute settlement mecha-
nism to resolve fact-specific disputes is unlikely to pose a serious threat to the
stability of the underlying tax treaty regime. The losing country most likely
will accept the loss in the expectation that it will win other cases in the future
and that it will not be systematically disadvantaged over time."
This Article focuses, however, on disputes that involve policy-level con-
flicts between domestic law and treaty obligations. Typically, such conflicts
will arise as a result of tax treaty overrides. Suppose the U.S. Congress enacts
legislation that arguably-or perhaps even admittedly-violates a tax treaty
obligation, such as the nondiscrimination obligation." Under U.S. constitu-
tional law, statutes and international treaties have equal force. 24 A domestic
court will apply a subsequently enacted statute over an earlier treaty if the two
conflict. Thus, under domestic law, Congress can override an existing treaty
provision by enacting new legislation."z In doing so, however, Congress
breaches U.S. obligations under international law.'26 Other governments and
commentators have expressed concern that such legislative overrides of tax
treaties have become increasingly common in recent years. 27
118. See S. ExEc. REP. No. 104-9, at 46 (1995); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
supra note 113, at44.
119. See STAFF OF THE JoINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 114, at 25; Technical
Explanation, supra note 114, art. 26, at 27,197-41.
120. See U.S.-Kazakhstan Technical Explanation, supra note 115, art. 26, reprinted in 2 Tax
Treaties (CCH) 5348, at 34,421-30 (1995).
121. For a discussion of the types of cases that the United States might agree to arbitrate, see
David R. Tillinghast, The Choice of Issues to Be Submitted to Arbitration Under Income Tax Conventions,
in ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL TAxATION 349 (Herbert H. Alpert & Kees van Raad eds., 1993).
122. See FEDERAL INcOME TAX PROJECr, supra note 26, at 111 (noting that it is unlikely that,
over time, revenue interests of either country would be significantly prejudiced by decisions of impartial
arbitral panels).
123. For example, in 1989, Congress enacted a tax provision that denies the U.S. subsidiary of a
foreign corporation a deduction for any "excess" interest that it pays to its foreign parent. See infra note
293. This provision arguably discriminates against foreign-owned U.S. corporations and therefore violates
the nondiscrimination articles of the United States's income tax treaties. See infra notes 294-295 and
accompanying text.
124. See U.S. CONSr. art. VI, § 2; I.R.C. § 7852(d)(1) (1994); RESTATEMENT, supra note 26,
§ 115 (1)(a), § 115 cmt. a & reporter's note 1; FEDERAL INCOME TAx PRoJEcr, supra note 26, at 63-72.
125. See The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (1 Wall.) 616, 621 (1871) ("A treaty may supersede a
prior act of Congress, and an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty.").
126. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, § 115(1)(b), § 115 cmt. b & reporter's note 2; FEDERAL
INCOmE TAx PRowr, supra note 26, at 73-76.
127. See, e.g., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PRoJEcr, supra note 26, at 78-80; Committee on U.S.
Activities of Foreign Tax Payers and Foreign Activities of U.S. Taxpayers, N.Y. St. B. Ass'n, Legislative
Overrides of Tax Treaties, 37 Tax Notes (Tax Analysts) 931 (Nov. 30, 1987); Richard L. Doemberg,
Legislative Override of Income Tax Treaties: The Branch Profits Tax and Congressional Arrogation of
Authority, 42 TAX LAW. 173 (1989) [hereinafter Doemberg, Legislative Override of Income Tax Treaties];
Richard L. Doemberg, Overriding Tax Treaties: The U.S. Perspective, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 71 (1995)
[hereinafter Doemberg, Overriding Tax Treaties]; EEC Group of Six Warns Against Treaty Overrides,
reprinted in 36 Tax Notes (Tax Analysts) 437 (July 27, 1987); OECD Comm. on Fiscal Affairs, Report on
Tax Treaty Overrides (1990), reprinted in 2 Tax Notes Int'l (Tax Analysts) 25 (Feb. 14, 1990); OECD
Ambassadors Protest Foreign Tax Bill (Aug. 5, 1992), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNI File, 92
TN 32-H.
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It is unrealistic to expect the competent authority procedure to deal ef-
fectively with such policy-level conflicts.'2 One would hardly expect the U.S.
competent authority-an IRS official-to agree to disregard domestic legisla-
tion that conflicts with an earlier treaty when that legislation is controlling un-
der domestic law.129 Quite simply, the competent authority procedure never
was intended to deal with fundamental disputes about the international consen-
sus on income tax rules. 3' The arbitration provisions discussed above also
would fail to deal with policy-level conflicts. The EU Arbitration Convention
applies only to transfer pricing disputes, which generally are regarded as fact-
specific rather than as involving policy-level conflicts between domestic law
and treaty obligations.' Moreover, the arbitration provisions in recent U.S.
income tax treaties provide only for voluntary arbitration. They are expressly
intended not to apply to disputes that raise issues of "tax policy" or "domestic
tax law." Indeed, under the current international tax regime, a country ag-
grieved by a tax treaty override usually will lack any legalistic remedy for the
breach of international law.'32 Ultimately, such disputes can be dealt with only
through diplomatic channels-in other words, through an antilegalist ap-
proach.
The inclusion of income tax measures under the GATT, as proposed
during the Uruguay Round of negotiations, would have made a wide range of
"tax policies" and "domestic tax laws" subject to mandatory legalistic GATT
dispute settlement procedures. The United States's opposition was based in
large part on its unwillingness to have its tax policies and tax laws subject to
quasi-judicial international review. 33 This raises the question of why the
United States led the way in the Uruguay Round negotiations in making most
domestic laws that affect trade subject to legalistic international dispute set-
tlement'" but attempted completely to exclude domestic tax laws.
128. Several U.S. income tax treaties do, however, contain provisions addressing this situation.
Article 29(6) of the 1992 treaty with the Netherlands provides that if the competent authority of one of the
states becomes aware that a domestic law may be applied in a manner that impedes the full implementation
of the treaty, it is obligated to consult the other side. See U.S.-Netherlands Treaty, supra note 106, art.
29(6), at 90-91. The protocol accompanying the 1992 treaty with Mexico contains similar language.
Paragraph 20 of the protocol provides that if the competent authority of one state considers the law of
another state to be applied in a manner that "eliminates or significantly limits a benefit" of the treaty, that
state may request consultations "with a view to restoring the balance of benefits of the Convention." U.S.-
Mexico Treaty, supra note 105, protocol, para. 20, at 70.
129. See FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECr, supra note 26, at 73 (noting that "it is unrealistic to
expect that a competent authority would systematically redress treaty breaches through the mutual
agreement process"); Doemberg, Legislative Override of Income Tax Treaties, supra note 127, at 204
(noting that "it is unlikely that the Treasury will circumvent domestic law through the competent authority
process").
130. Originally, the League of Nations served as the principal international forum for developing
a consensus on income tax rules. See Richard J. Vann, The Role of International Economic Organisations
in Promoting International Tax Cooperation 2 (Feb. 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
In the case of developed countries, this function has now been taken over primarily by the OECD. Id. at 3-
6.
131. As noted earlier, however, some transfer pricing disputes might involve such conflicts. See
supra note 90 and accompanying text.
132. See FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, supra note 26, at 73-74 (discussing available
remedies); Doerberg, Legislative Override of Income Tax Treaties, supra note 127, at 204-06 (same);
Doemberg, Overriding Tax Treaties, supra note 127, at 115 (same).
133. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
134. See Young, supra note 13, at 390 (noting that United States has usually been leading
proponent of "legalistic" approach to GATT dispute settlement).
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IV. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AS A MEANS OF MANAGING RETALIATORY
STRATEGIES
Part HI of this Article argued that the mechanisms for resolving tax
treaty disputes are markedly antilegalistic, even in fact-specific disputes and
particularly in disputes that involve policy-level conflicts between domestic
law and tax treaty obligations. Scholars have given little attention to the design
of intergovernmental dispute settlement mechanisms for resolving such policy-
level conflicts between domestic tax laws and tax treaty obligations. They ap-
pear to assume that decisions to override tax treaty obligations are matters of
sovereign prerogative that cannot usefully be subjected to the discipline of in-
ternational dispute settlement procedures. But, as discussed in Part II, the dis-
pute settlement system in the GATT routinely deals with precisely this type of
policy-level conflict. How can one account for the radically different treatment
of such conflicts under the two regimes?
To analyze this paradox, one needs a theory of how intergovernmental
dispute settlement works. This Part and Part V of the Article draw on interna-
tional relations theory to develop a theory of dispute settlement as a device for
promoting and maintaining cooperative international regimes.
The international relations approach begins with the simple observation
that international economic organizations, even relatively legalistic ones such
as the GATT, ultimately lack coercive power.'35 Treaties and treaty organiza-
tions are therefore incapable of establishing rules that countries must follow.
As a result, intergovernmental dispute settlement systems must operate very
differently from domestic systems. Domestic dispute settlement systems fa-
cilitate cooperation by enabling parties to make binding commitments. This
is not possible in the intergovernmental context. Self-interested governments
will violate their agreements and defy the rulings of dispute settlement bodies
when they benefit from doing so.
International relations theorists draw different conclusions from these
premises. The "realist" school argues that nations are fundamentally con-
cerned with survival in the anarchy of world politics. Although nations form
alliances to achieve balances of power, they are always concerned that their
allies will gain more from a cooperative relationship than they do-today's
ally might become tomorrow's enemy. Because of the need for all countries
to achieve relative gains, cooperation tends to be exceptional and short-lived.
Under this view, institutions for long-term cooperation are largely "window-
dressing. "136 If one accepts this conclusion, then intergovernmental dispute
settlement mechanisms are essentially irrelevant, and there is little point in
analyzing them.
135. On the other hand, certain international economic organizations, such as the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, are able to exercise considerable economic leverage over some
countries.
136. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Modem International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for
InternationalLawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335, 337-38 (1989) (noting that "Classical Realists see a world
of states obsessed with their power vis-t-vis other states. International rules and institutions are mere
window-dressing: their creation and decline, and the degree to which states respect them, depend solely on
the current power realities") (footnotes omitted); see also HELEN V. MILNER, INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS,
AND INFORMATION: DoMEsTIc PoLcucs AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 6-7 (1997) (noting that for
Realists, "long-term, institutionalized cooperation among nations seems particularly anomalous").
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The "neoliberal institutionalist" school, however, rejects this conclusion
and argues that even though treaties and treaty organizations lack coercive
power, they are not necessarily ineffective.137 Neoliberals regard nations as
concerned with absolute gains rather than with relative gains; this greatly
magnifies the possibilities for long-term cooperation. Neoliberals acknowl-
edge that governments are self-interested, but they argue that international
regimes"3 can affect government behavior by changing the domestic political
context in which governments make decisions based on self-interest. 39
If one adopts this latter viewpoint, as this Article does, then one can
draw upon powerful analytical tools and insights to analyze how dispute settle-
ment systems aid in promoting international cooperation. First, the neoliberal
school has drawn upon noncooperative game theory, particularly as it is ap-
plied to the iterated prisoner's dilemma, to argue that international cooperation
can emerge and be sustained if countries adopt retaliatory strategies. Applying
this approach to intergovernmental dispute settlement, one can analyze dispute
settlement as a device for managing these retaliatory strategies. Second, the
neoliberal school has drawn upon another game, the "assurance game," and
upon the economics of information to argue that noncompliance can result
from information failures. Under this approach, the primary function of dis-
pute settlement is to generate and disseminate the information that is necessary
for the maintenance of cooperation.
This Part examines the role of dispute settlement mechanisms in man-
aging retaliatory strategies, both in the international trade context and in the
international tax context. Part V then examines the role of dispute settlement
mechanisms in generating and disseminating information. The Article argues
ultimately that legalistic dispute settlement mechanisms are much more im-
portant in ensuring that these functions are adequately performed in the inter-
national trade context than in the international tax context.
A. Retaliatory Strategies in the International Trade Regime
International trade theorists commonly view trade agreements as coop-
erative solutions to a prisoner's dilemma. 140 Noncooperative game theory
137. For brief summaries of the current debate between realists and neoliberal institutionalists, see
MnLNER, supra note 136, at 23-26; and David A. Baldwin, Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World
Politics, in NEOREAUSM AND NEOLIBERA.ISM: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 4, 4-8 (David A. Baldwin
ed., 1993).
138. According to a widely cited definition, international regimes are
sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around
which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are
beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms
of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Deci-
sion-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective
choice.
Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in
INTERNATIONAL REGmMEs 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983). For an elaboration of this definition, see
ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD PoUTICAL
ECONOMY 57-61 (1984).
139. See KEOHANE, supra note 138, at 13.
140. See, e.g., PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS:
THEORY AND PoulcY 238-41 (3d ed. 1994); TREBiLCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 55, at 91; G. Richard
Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization,
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shows that, in an iterated prisoner's dilemma, cooperation can emerge and be
sustained if the players adopt retaliatory strategies.' 4 One then can conceptu-
alize dispute settlement as a means of managing these strategies. To utilize
this theory, one must determine why international trade is a prisoner's di-
lemma, how retaliatory strategies result in cooperation, and why it is neces-
sary to manage these retaliatory strategies.
The characterization of international trade as a prisoner's dilemma might
seem at odds with the standard conclusion of international trade economics
that a country will maximize its national economic welfare by adopting a pol-
icy of free trade, regardless of what other countries do.'42 This conclusion de-
pends on the assumptions that markets are perfectly competitive, that the
country in question is "small," 43 and that the country takes the trade policies
of other countries as a given.'" Many economists argue, however, that even
when these assumptions are not satisfied-so that a theoretical case for gov-
ernment intervention in trade exists-governments are unlikely to have the
necessary information or incentives to intervene in ways that maximize na-
tional economic welfare.' 45 Thus, free trade is virtually always the best policy
in practice. Under this view, if countries were run by rational, well-informed
politicians whose objectives were to maximize national economic welfare, the
international trade game would not be a prisoner's dilemma, but rather a game
of "harmony": 46 The dominant strategy for each player would be to practice
44 DUKE L.J. 829, 862-63 (1995); Alan 0. Sykes, "Mandatory" Retaliation for Bread of Trade
Agreements: Some Thoughts on the Strategic Design of Section 301, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 301, 305-10
(1990). For a brief discussion of the iterated prisoner's dilemma, see infra notes 153-162 and accompany-
ing text.
141. See infra notes 158-161 and accompanying text.
142. See SLEMROD, supra note 35, at 2.
143. "Small" for this purpose means that the level of the country's imports and exports do not
significantly affect the world price of those products.
144. See SLEMROD, supra note 35, at 3-4.
145. See, e.g., KRUGMAN & OBSrFMELD, supra note 140, at 234-36; Paul R. Krugman, 77te
Narrow and Broad Arguments for Free Trade, 83 AM. ECON. RE,. 362, 364-65 (1993); Rachel
McCulloch, The Optimality of Free Trade: Science or Religion?, 83 AM. ECON. REv. 367, 369-71 (1993).
146. See Abbott, supra note 136, at 357 (noting that two countries with preferences of liberal
economists would find international trade a harmony game).





In this table, each row represents a strategy that Country I might adopt (cooperate or defect) and
each column represents a strategy that Country 11 might adopt (cooperate or defect). Each cell therefore
represents a possible outcome of the game. The pair of numbers in the cell indicate the payoffs to Country
I and Country II for that outcome. For example, the cell in the upper left-hand corner represents the
outcome in which Country land Country II mutually cooperate. Each country receives a payoff of 4 in this
outcome. If Country I were unilaterally to defect, the result would be the cell in the lower left-hand corner.
In this outcome, Country I receives a payoff of 3, and Country II receives a payoff of 1-both countries are
worse off than under mutual cooperation. In this game, each country obtains the highest possible payoff by
cooperating, regardless of what the other country does.
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free trade. 47 There would be no need for international trade agreements or in-
stitutions, including dispute settlement systems.
Of course, governments are not run by such politicians. As a crude but
illuminating assumption, suppose that the objective of politicians is not to
maximize national economic welfare but rather to maximize their political re-
wards. 4 1 Politicians then would find it in their interest to support tariffs and
other import restrictions. These measures usually redistribute income from
consumers to import-competing producers. Since producers in a single indus-
try are usually more able than the consumers of their products to overcome
collective action problems, they usually will be able to "pay" politicians more
for voting for the redistributive policy than consumers will be able to pay
them for voting against it.'49 From this perspective, the international trade
game is not a game of harmony at all but rather a game of "deadlock": 150 The
dominant strategy for each politician-player is to impose tariffs and other im-
port restrictions.
An international trade agreement changes the payoff structure of this
game. The prospect of entering into such an agreement mobilizes a counter-
vailing interest group-producers of exports-who will support the agreement
because it will give them greater access to foreign markets.' 5' Assuming that
147. See Abbott, supra note 136, at 357.
148. See Sykes, supra note 140, at 306 & n.28 (noting that such "rewards" might take form of
votes, campaign contributions, and so forth). This assumption underlies the economic theory of legislation,
which has been described as follows:
In the economists' version of the interest-group theory of government, legislation is sup-
plied to groups or coalitions that outbid rival seekers of favorable legislation. The price that
the winning group bids is determined both by the value of legislative protection to the
group's members and the group's ability to overcome the free-rider problems that plague
coalitions. Payment takes the form of campaign contributions, votes, implicit promises of
future favors, and sometimes outright bribes. In short, legislation is "sold" by the legisla-
ture and "bought" by the beneficiaries of the legislation.
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18
J.L. & EcoN. 875, 877 (1975). For a critical discussion of this theory, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PIuIP P.
FRICKEY, LAW AND PuBLc CHoIcE: A CRrICAL INTRODUCTION 21-33 (1991).
149. See KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 140, at 237.
150. The game of deadlock has the following payoff structure:
Cooperate Defect
Count I Cooperate 2,2 1,4
Defect 4,1 3,3
See Abbott, supra note 136, at 357-59.
151. See I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE PoLrrCs 289 (3d ed. 1995); KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD,
supra note 140, at 239-41. Other potential interest groups on the side of free trade include industrial users
of imports, retailers, and even foreign firms and governments. See DESrLER, supra, at 291 (discussing
potential role of retailers and industrial users of imported inputs in supporting liberal trade politics);
Stephen Engelberg & Martin Tolchin, Foreigners Find New Ally in U.S. Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2,
1993, at Al (discussing U.S. industry support of foreign governments and firms lobbying for free trade).
One might ask why a country's producers of exports would not be mobilized to oppose import
restrictions on a case by case basis, even when a trade agreement is not on the political agenda. After all, if
their home country were to enact trade restrictions, they could anticipate that foreign countries might
retaliate, impairing their ability to sell abroad. One answer is that the trade agreement provides a prominent
"focal point" that facilitates concerted political action. Cf. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF
CONFLIcr 57-58 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing importance of focal points in facilitating coordination).
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these producers will pay more in support of the agreement than import-
competing producers will pay in opposition, politicians will perceive it in their
interest to support the free trade agreement.
This analysis assumes that the producers of exports believe that foreign
governments will comply with the agreement. Obviously, if the agreement is a
meaningless piece of paper, it is not worth paying for. Adherence is not as-
sured because there is no supranational enforcement power.' Nor will the
politicians necessarily adhere voluntarily to the agreement: On the contrary,
once an international trade agreement is in place, politicians themselves face a
prisoner's dilemma.'53 From their perspective, the best outcome occurs if
other countries comply with the agreement while they cheat by enacting trade
restrictions that violate the agreement. 154 This outcome pleases all domestic
interest groups because the producers of exports get the foreign free trade
policies for which they paid, and the import-competing producers get the pro-
tection that they want (and for which they are willing to pay) as well. 5 '
Moreover, the worst outcome for domestic politicians occurs if other countries
cheat while they comply. This outcome displeases all domestic interest
groups. Despite the agreement, the domestic producers of exports face foreign
trade restrictions; because of the agreement, domestic import-competing pro-
ducers face competition from foreign imports unaided by legislative protec-
tion.
Given this situation, the dominant strategy for domestic politicians trying
to maximize their political support is to cheat. 56 If the other country complies,
this produces the best outcome; if the other country cheats, it avoids the worst
outcome.
The dilemma is that if all countries adopt this dominant strategy of
cheating, the outcome is worse for each country than if all countries had com-
plied with the agreement.157 Mutual cheating is an inferior outcome to mutual
compliance, even from a politician's perspective, because of our assumption
that the producers of exports (who prefer mutual compliance) are a more
powerful interest group than the import-competing producers (who prefer
mutual cheating). Also, the global welfare benefits of free trade-for which
the politician might be able to claim credit-are lost.
Despite this pessimistic analysis, it is possible in practice for cooperation
to emerge and be maintained. This is because international trade is not a sin-
gle-play game, as discussed above, but rather a game of indefinitely repeated
152. See Sykes, supra note 140, at 305.
153. The prisoner's dilemma game has the following payoff structure:
_Cbrunm
Cooperate Defect







See Sykes, supra note 140, at 306.
See Shell, supra note 140, at 862.
See Sykes, supra note 140, at 307.
See id.
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play."5 8 In such an iterated game, players can adopt retaliatory strategies.15 9
The best known of these strategies is "tit-for-tat." " In this strategy, a player
"cooperates" on the first move. On each succeeding move, that player mimics
what the other player did in the previous move. If one player knows that the
other player has adopted this strategy, then he rationally will adopt the strat-
egy that maximizes the present value of the stream of his future payoffs
against this strategy. To the extent that he values a payoff received in the fu-
ture less than the same payoff received today, he will discount each future
payoff in calculating the present value of the stream of future payoffs.'' But
as long as he does not discount the future too heavily, the optimal strategy
might be cooperation. It will not pay to cheat if the immediate benefit from
cheating is outweighed by the discounted costs imposed in the future when the
other player retaliates.
In the international trade context, fit-for-tat and other retaliatory strate-
gies work by affecting the balance of political forces in the target country. As
noted above, a country is likely to adopt a policy of restricting trade if the
domestic interest groups that benefit from such a policy (import-competing
producers) are politically more powerful than the domestic groups that are
harmed (consumers). Retaliation by another country, if carefully targeted, will
cause economic harm to other concentrated interest groups in the target coun-
try (producers of exports). Those interest groups then will bring political pres-
sure that might offset the pressure of the interest groups that sought the trade
restriction in the first place.62
The theory that international cooperation emerges and is maintained
through the adoption of retaliatory strategies runs into difficulties in practice.
First, the theory assumes that each player is able to interpret the other's
moves accurately as either cooperation, defection, or retaliation for a previous
defection.163 If this determination cannot be made reliably, retaliatory strate-
gies such as tit-for-tat break down. 164 For example, suppose that a treaty obli-
gation is ambiguous. Country A takes an action that it believes to be in com-
pliance with this obligation. Country B, however, interprets A's action to be a
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLuTION OF COOPERATION (1984) (discussing
computer simulation that utilizes "tit-for-tat" strategy); Robert Axelrod, The Emergence of Cooperation
Among Egoists, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 308 (1981) (describing cooperative strategy between two
interacting players where at each successive stage of action players act reciprocally).
161. See AXELROD, supra note 160, at 12-13. Players tend to value payoffs less the longer they
have to wait to receive them; in addition, they tend to discount future payoffs because of the possibility that
the game will not continue to that point. See id. at 12. One can take this into account by discounting future
payoffs to "present value" by multiplying them by the fraction W, where w is the "discount parameter"
and n measures the length of time (e.g., number of moves or number of years) until the payoff is obtained.
Axelrod gives the following example:
[S]uppose that each move is only half as important as the previous move, making w = V2.
Then a whole string of mutual defections worth one point each move would have a value of
1 on the first move, 1/4 on the second move, 1/4 on the third move, and so on. The cumula-
tive value of the sequence would be 1 + /2 + /4 + Vs .. which would sum to exactly 2.
Id. at 13.
162. See Davey, supra note 3, at 100-01.
163. See Abbott, supra note 136, at 366.
164. See AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBuFF, THNImNG STRATEGICALLY: THE
COMPETrrIVE EDGE IN BusINESS, PoLITICS, AND EVERYDAY LIE 109-13 (1991); Sykes, supra note 140, at
310.
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breach of the treaty. B therefore retaliates. A, believing that it has complied
with the treaty, will view B's action as an unprovoked breach and therefore
will retaliate as well. B, in turn, will view A's retaliation as another breach
and will retaliate again-and so on ad infinitum. In the case of international
trade, the result is a "trade war."
In theory, one can invent "nicer" versions of the tit-for-tat strategy un-
der which this series of echoing retaliations will tend to dampen out over
time.165 In practice, however, it likely will be difficult to solve this problem
through the adoption of modified strategies. A better approach might be to de-
velop an institution-a dispute settlement system-to interpret actions as being
in compliance or noncompliance with treaty obligations and to sanction re-
taliations in instances of noncompliance." All treaty countries might find it in
their interest to adhere to the determinations of such a system in order to pre-
vent the cooperative equilibrium that results from the use of retaliatory strate-
gies from breaking down under conditions of ambiguity.
A dispute settlement mechanism also could facilitate the convergence of
expectations that is necessary for cooperation. In order for a country to calcu-
late whether a cooperative strategy will maximize the discounted present value
of its future payoffs, it must understand what strategy the other country has
adopted. One difficulty is that there are many different retaliatory strategies
that "solve" the iterated prisoner's dilemma. 67 One example other than tit-for-
tat is the "grim" strategy, in which a player cooperates on the first move and
continues to cooperate on succeeding moves as long as the other player also
cooperates. 6 ' Once the other player defects, however, the first player defects
forever after. This multiplicity of potential strategies can impede the conver-
gence of expectations necessary for cooperation. A dispute settlement mecha-
nism can promote this convergence by defining appropriate levels of retalia-
tion for given breaches. 69 The GATT dispute settlement system, for example,
deals with this issue in detail. 1
70
Finally, a dispute settlement system can help to legitimize the use of re-
taliatory strategies. Unilateral retaliation generally will lack legitimacy. When
a government imposes unilateral sanctions, it acts as both prosecutor and
judge; the resulting sanctions are more likely to be perceived as the exertion
165. See Dxr& NALEBuFF, supra note 164, at 113-15.
166. See John G. Cross, Comments on Kovenock and Thursby, in ANALYTICAL AND
NEGOTIATING IssuEs IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSrEM, supra note 35, at 396, 397 (arguing that it may be
more efficient to create public organizations to distinguish cooperation from noncompliance than to attempt
to develop conditional trade strategies); Dan Kovenock & Marie Thursby, GAT, Dispute Settlement, and
Cooperation, in ANALYTICAL AND NEGOTIATING IssUES IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYsTEM, supra note 35,
at 361, 385 (arguing that dispute settlement procedures serve as monitoring device that distinguishes
between true deviations from cooperative agreement and mistaken perceptions or claims that such deviation
has occurred); see also Abbott, supra note 136, at 366-68 (discussing why international regimes may be
better than states at interpreting behavior and defining sanctions).
167. See DAVID M. KREs, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELLING 96-99 (1990); Sykes,
supra note 140, at 308.
168. See KREPS, supra note 167, at 97-98; Sykes, supra note 140, at 308. One seldom sees the
"grim" strategy employed in practice. Because it is completely unforgiving, it does not do well when
played against many other strategies. See AXELROD, supra note 160, at 35-40 (discussing importance of
"forgiveness" in strategies for playing prisoner's dilemma game repeatedly).
169. See Cross, supra note 166, at 398.
170. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 1, arts. 22-23 (specifying procedures for
determining appropriate methods and levels of retaliation).
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of power by the stronger country over the weaker rather than as the enforce-
ment of common norms. 
171
This theory of cooperation describes international trade relations quite
well. Countries have frequently employed unilateral retaliatory strategies in
their international trade relations. In particular, unilateral trade retaliation has
been highly formalized and institutionalized in the United States. 72 American
trade law contains several provisions authorizing the President unilaterally to
impose trade sanctions against foreign governments. The most important of
these provisions is section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.'73 Section 301(a) re-
quires the administration to take "mandatory" action in cases in which a for-
eign government violates an international trade agreement with the United
States. 74 Section 301(b) provides for "discretionary" action in cases in which
a foreign act, policy, or practice is "unreasonable or discriminatory and bur-
dens and restricts United States commerce" but does not violate any interna-
tional trade agreement. 5 The statute provides for a range of possible ac-
tions, 171 including retaliation. For example, the United States could impose
duties or other restrictions on imports of goods or services from the country
under investigation." The level of retaliation must "be devised so as to affect
goods or services of the foreign country in an amount that is equivalent in
171. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA H. CHAYEs, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPUNT 'CE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 106-08 (1995).
172. In 1984, the European Community adopted a trade retaliation measure similar to the U.S.
section 301 measure. See Council Regulation 2641/84 on the Strengthening of the Common Commercial
Policy with Regard in Particular to Protection Against Illicit Commercial Practices, 1984 O.J. (L 252) 1.
See generally Daniel Partan, Retaliation in United States and European Community Trade Law, 8 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 333 (1990) (discussing U.S. trade retaliation).
173. Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994).
174. Specifically, section 301(a) applies when "the rights of the United States under any trade
agreement are being denied" or when "an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country... violates, or is
inconsistent with, the provisions of, or otherwise denies benefits to the United States under, any trade
agreement, or... is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce." 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1).
A section 301 proceeding can be initiated after "interested persons" such as domestic firms and
workers, representatives of consumer interests, or U.S. exporters file a petition with the U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR). See id. § 2412(a)(1). The USTR must then review the petition and determine
whether to initiate an investigation. See id. § 2412(a)(2). Alternatively, the USTR may begin an
investigation on his or her own initiative. See id. § 2412(b). After the USTR commences an investigation,
he or she must request informal consultations with the foreign government in question. See id. § 2413. If
these consultations are unsuccessful, or in any case after 150 days, the USTR must invoke the dispute
settlement procedures of any trade agreement in question-usually, although not always, the GAIT. See
id. § 2413(a)(2). No later than 18 months after the initiation of the investigation, whether or not the
international dispute settlement procedures have concluded, the USTR must determine whether the practice
in question violates the legal rights of the United States or otherwise falls within the scope of section 301.
See id. § 2414. If this determination is in the affirmative, the USTR must, in the case of mandatory action
cases, take action in response to the practice, subject to the specific direction of the President. See id.
§ 2415. Even in the case of mandatory actions, however, the statute provides a list of situations in which
the USTR is not required to act, such as (in the case of an alleged GAIT violation) if the GATT DSB
adopts a report finding that the practice does not violate the GATT; if the USTR finds that the foreign
country is taking satisfactory measures to conform its practice to the GATT; if it is impossible for the
foreign country to take satisfactory measures, but it agrees to provide compensatory trade benefits; if the
taking of action would have an adverse impact on the U.S. economy out of proportion to the benefits; or if
action would cause serious harm to national security. See id. § 2411 (a)(2).
175. See id. § 2411(b).
176. Non-retaliatory options include the negotiation of an agreement to eliminate the practice or
its harmful effect on U.S. commerce, or, alternatively, to provide compensation to the United States in the
form of trade concessions on other goods or services. See id. § 2411(c)(1)(D).
177. See id. § 2411(c).
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value to the burden or restriction being imposed by that country on United
$178States commerce' '-in other words, the statute contemplates a tit-for-tat
strategy. 
179
Although the practice of unilateral retaliation under section 301 has been
widely criticized,18° several studies have concluded that, as the theory de-
scribed above predicts, section 301 has been reasonably successful in opening
foreign markets and has made a positive contribution to moving the global
trading system toward significant reforms."' At the same time, however, the
unilateral use of retaliation has led to considerable international dissatisfaction.
By the time of the Uruguay Round, many countries perceived a need to bring
unilateral retaliation under the control of a stronger dispute settlement mecha-
nism. This is widely believed to have been the principal reason why many
countries that traditionally had opposed legalistic trade dispute settlement ul-
timately agreed to support the Uruguay Round reforms to the GATT dispute
settlement process.1
82
In particular, prior to the Uruguay Round reforms, the GATT dispute
settlement system was weak because it required consensus at each step: for-
mation of a panel, adoption of the panel report by the contracting parties, and
authorization of retaliation. A losing country that was unwilling to redress its
violation of the GATT would block consensus at some stage before retaliation
was authorized. As a result, the pre-Uruguay Round GATT dispute settlement
system authorized retaliation only once in its history, in 1955.183 In the Uru-
guay Round, U.S. negotiators argued that the U.S. Congress would continue
to insist on a policy of unilateral retaliation against "unfair" trade practices
unless the GATT had a legal enforcement procedure that met U.S. standards
of effectiveness." 8 Faced with the alternative of continued use of unilateral
178. Seeid. §2411(a)(3).
179. In addition, two provisions of the Trade Act of 1974 require the administration to self-
initiate section 301 investigations in certain cases. "Special 301" requires the U.S. Trade Representative
(USTR) to identify "priority foreign countries" that deny "adequate and effective protection of intellectual
property rights" and that are not making progress to eliminate the problem. See id. § 2242. After
identifying those countries, the USTR must self-initiate section 301 investigations unless he or she
determines that doing so would be detrimental to U.S. economic interests. See id. § 2412(b)(2). Finally,
"Super 301" requires the USTR to identify "priority foreign country practices, the elimination of which is
likely to have the most significant potential to increase U.S. exports." See id. § 2420 (a)(1)(b). The USTR
is then required to self-initiate section 301 investigations with respect to all identified priority foreign
country practices. See id. § 2420(b).
180. Critics have argued that the bypassing of multilateral procedures will undermine the long-
term sustainability of the GATT system. They also argue that section 301 will result in market closing
rather than market opening because if section 301 threats fail, the resulting U.S. retaliation will result in
increased protection and, moreover, might trigger foreign counterretaliation, resulting in further protection.
They also argue that the threat of unilateral retaliation against a foreign country is likely to result in
bilateral agreements that discriminate in favor of the United States; that is, governments in the targeted
country will divert trade from other countries to the United States, keeping total imports steady, rather than
genuinely liberalizing trade. Finally, they argue that the ability of export-oriented interests to achieve their
market-opening objectives though aggressive unilateralism reduces the incentives for these interests to
oppose protectionist measures in order to promote free trade. See, e.g., THOMAS 0. BAYARD & KIMBERLY
ANN ELuO'r, R pcRocrry AND RrAAn ON IN U.S. TRADE PoulcY 53-55 (1994) (criticizing aggressive
unilateral action).
181. See id.; Alan 0. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in International Commercial
Relations: The Limited Case for Section 301, 23 LAW & POL'Y INr'L BUS. 263 (1992).
182. See HuDEc, supra note 9, at 237, 362; Shell, supra note 140, at 898-99.
183. See supra note 23.
184. See HUDEC, supra note 9, at 237; Transcript of Discussion Following Presentation by
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retaliation by the United States, governments that would have preferred a
more voluntary adjudication system apparently became persuaded that a more
legalistic GATT dispute settlement system was the lesser of two evils.185
B. Retaliatory Strategies in the International Tax Regime
Section A analyzed how international trade can be viewed as a prisoner's
dilemma, how the use of retaliatory strategies can lead to cooperative out-
comes, and how the need to manage these strategies can lead to the adoption
of legalistic dispute settlement mechanisms. One now must examine whether a
similar analysis applies to the international tax regime.
Under generally accepted principles of international taxation, countries
assert jurisdiction to tax income on the basis of both the residence principle
and the source principle.I8 6 Under the residence principle, a country is entitled
to tax its nationals and residents on their worldwide income. " Under the
source principle, a country is entitled to tax nonresidents on the income they
derive from sources within the country.88 High or discriminatory source-
based taxation of nonresidents can act as a barrier to foreign trade and in-
vestment. Tax treaties therefore facilitate international trade and investment
by limiting source-based taxation in several ways.8 9
First, they limit the tax rates that source countries may impose on cross-
border payments of investment income, such as dividends, interest, and royal-
ties, to nonresidents."9 They also prohibit source countries from taxing the in-
come of foreign enterprises that do not maintain a substantial presence, in the
form of a "permanent establishment," in the source country. 9 ' Second, tax
treaties prohibit source countries from imposing discriminatory taxes on non-
residents."9 This nondiscrimination rule restricts the use of source-based taxes
to favor domestic enterprises over foreign enterprises. It also indirectly con-
strains the overall level of source-based taxation. Given the nondiscrimination
rule, a source country that wants to impose high income taxes on foreign-
Kenneth W. Abbott, 1992 CoLuM. Bus. L. Rnv. 151, 154 (remarks of Robert E. Hudec).
185. See HUDEC, supra note 9, at 237; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Note, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 663
(1995) (reviewing HuDEC, supra note 9).
The Dispute Settlement Understanding requires GATT members to pledge that they will pursue
claims of violation and/or nullification and impairment exclusively through the multilateral dispute
settlement procedures. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 1, art. 21. The U.S. Congress
has explicitly provided, however, that the Uruguay Round Agreements do not preempt section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974 as a matter of municipal law. See Uruguay Round Agreement Act § 102(a)(1),
(a)(2)(B), 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1), (a)(2)(B) (1994).
186. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, at 258 (noting broad international consensus on law of
jurisdiction to tax); FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROjEcr, supra note 26, at 5 (noting general acceptance of
these two principles as bases for jurisdiction).
187. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, § 412(l)(a). In the case of the United States, see I.R.C.
§ 61(a) (1994), which defines gross income to mean all income "from whatever source derived."
188. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, § 412(1)(b)-(c); FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJEcT, supra
note 26, at 5. In the case of the United States, see I.R.C. § 871 (1994), which imposes a tax on nonresident
alien individuals; id. § 881, which places a tax on the income of foreign corporations not connected with a
U.S. trade or business; and id. § 882, which imposes a tax on the income of foreign corporations
connected with a U.S. trade or business.
189. See FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJEct, supra note 26, at 2,9-10.
190. Seeid. at9.
191. See id. at 10.
192. See id. at 11; supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
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owned enterprises must impose equally high income taxes on domestically
owned enterprises; in doing so, however, it will be constrained by the political
power of the domestic owners. Third, tax treaties coordinate the domestic tax
systems of the two treaty countries to eliminate the trade- and investment-
restricting double taxation that would occur if the countries were to make in-
consistent determinations of the residence of a taxpayer or the source of an
item of income."9
Section A began with the proposition of international trade economics
that a government that seeks to maximize national economic welfare generally
will choose, on a unilateral basis, not to impose tariffs or other trade restrict-
ing measures. Just as international trade economists have analyzed the design
of optimal trade policies, tax economists have studied the design of optimal
tax policies. There is a significant difference between the trade context and the
tax context, however. Reducing tariffs and other trade barriers to zero is a
feasible objective, but reducing all taxes to zero is not because governments
must raise revenue somehow. The question, then, is how to design a tax sys-
tem that raises the required revenue with the least distortion of the economy.
Although zero taxation is not possible in general, there is a rule of "optimal"
international taxation that holds that if capital is fully mobile internationally, a
small, open economy should not impose any source-based taxes on the income
from capital; that is, such taxes are always unnecessarily distortionary. 114
A country following this prescription would not impose any withholding
taxes on cross-border flows of income. Moreover, it would refrain not merely
from imposing discriminatory internal income taxes on foreign-owned firms
(as required by most tax treaties) but would refrain from imposing any internal
income taxes on such firms." A fortiori, a country following this optimal tax
prescription would have no incentive to violate tax treaty restrictions on
source-based taxation.
The underlying reason for this optimal tax rule is that if capital is fully
mobile internationally, a source-based income tax cannot have the effect of re-
ducing the after-tax return to capital invested in the country. If it did, inves-
tors would transfer their funds elsewhere and continue to earn the world rate
of return. Similarly, a source-based income tax cannot raise the price of goods
produced by firms in the source country, assuming that there is competition
from goods produced abroad and exported to the source country. Thus, the
burden of the tax will not be borne by suppliers of capital or by consumers.
Instead, it will fall on the suppliers of relatively immobile factors of produc-
tion, such as labor and land, in the host country. In economic equilibrium, the
wages and rents earned by these individuals will drop by enough to compen-
sate the firms for the tax payments. But if domestic laborers and landowners
will bear the burden of the tax in any case, it would be preferable to tax these
individuals directly by using some form of residence-based tax, such as an in-
193. See FEDERALINCOMETAXPROJECr, supra note 26, at 5-9.
194. See SLrmROD, supra note 35, at 12; Roger H. Gordon, Can Capital Income Taxes Survive
in Open Economies?, 47 J. FIN. 1159, 1159 (1992); Joel Slemrod, Tax Cacophony and the Benefits of Free
Trade, in 1 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 284, 300 n.2 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds.,
1996).
195. If government expenditures produce services that benefit foreign-owned finns, however, the
country should charge those firms for the marginal costs they impose. The charge would be based on costs
imposed rather than income earned. See Gordon, supra note 194, at 1163.
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come or wage tax imposed on residents, or a real estate tax. Such taxes would
have the same effect as source-based income taxes in terms of who ultimately
bears the burden, but they would be less distortionary because they would not
discourage investment in the country.196 Therefore, they represent the "opti-
mal" tax policy in the sense described above. Many countries adopt this opti-
mal tax policy in the case of portfolio interest payments made to nonresidents,
unilaterally exempting such payments from source-based taxation in the reali-
zation that the economic burden of such taxation would be borne by resident
debtors rather than by nonresident debt holders."
Thus, optimal tax theory yields the strong prescription that govern-
ments should not impose any source-based income taxes. Countries generally
do not follow this prescription, however.198 If the idealized economic as-
sumptions underlying the optimal tax model are relaxed and if additional
complications are introduced, one can find a number of reasons why gov-
ernments might want to impose nonzero source-based income taxes and why
they even might want to violate tax treaty rules restricting such taxes.
First, the optimal tax model discussed above assumes that capital is
fully mobile internationally. There is considerable empirical evidence, how-
ever, suggesting that capital is quite immobile internationally.' If capital is
immobile internationally, a tax on the income from capital invested in a
source country will not be shifted fully to other factors of production in the
source country, such as labor and land; therefore, capital-importing countries
might find it attractive to tax such income.' Similarly, a country large
enough to have market power with respect to imported capital can increase its
national economic welfare by imposing a nonzero tax on the income from for-
eign capital invested in the country.2"' This is analogous to the nonzero "opti-
mal tariff" in international trade theory.' International trade economists gen-
erally consider the optimal tariff to be theoretically interesting but to have lit-
196. See Slemrod, supra note 194, at 307 n.2; see also Gordon, supra note 194, at 1161 (stating
that such taxes cause less distortion); Lawrence H. Summers, Comments on Joel Slemrod, Effect of
Taxation with International Mobility, in UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME-
CONSUMPTION TAx 148, 149-55 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 1988) (discussing Slemrod's analysis and
effects of taxation).
197. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 871(h) (1994) (repealing tax on interest of nonresident alien individuals
received from certain portfolio debt investments); id. § 881(c) (repealing tax on interest of foreign
corporations received from certain portfolio debt investments).
198. See SLEMROD, supra note 35, at 9 (observing that optimal tax theory has not prevented
source-based taxation of capital income from being international norm); Slemrod, supra note 194, at 306
(noting that "Etihere is no convincing evidence that world tax systems are moving toward harmonization at
a zero capital income tax rate or any other uniform rate").
199. For a summary of this evidence and a discussion of possible explanations, see Roger H.
Gordon & A. Lans Bovenberg, Why Is Capital So Immobile Internationally? Possible Explanations and
Implications for Capital Income Taxation, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 1057, 1057-60 (1996).
200. See id. at 1058. Gordon and Bovenberg argue, however, that the immobility of capital can
best be explained by asymmetric information between investors in different countries. The surprising result
of their analysis is that a capital-importing country should subsidize rather than tax capital imports-the
opposite of standard practice, at least in developed countries. See id. at 1070-73.
201. See Gordon, supra note 194, at 1163-64; Joel Slemrod, Effect of Taxation with International
Capital Mobility, in UNEASY COMPROMISE, supra note 196, at 115, 133-35; Summers, supra note 196, at
151.
202. For a large country, there is an "optimal tariff" at which the marginal gain from improved
terms of trade just equals the marginal efficiency loss from production and consumption distortion. See
KRuGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 140, at 231-32; see also Slemrod, supra note 194, at 307 n.2.
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tie or no practical significance.20 Tariffs are explained much better by public
choice theory than by the existence of national market power in world mar-
kets. To some extent, however, national market power in capital markets
might explain observed levels of source-based taxation.'
Second, foreign firms might be able to earn location-specific economic
rents on their investment in the source country. The source country then could
tax those rents without causing the firms to disinvest, again making source-
based taxation attractive. 5
Third, some residence countries, including the United States, relieve
international double taxation by employing foreign tax credit systems. That
is, they allow their residents a credit against their domestic tax liability for
the foreign income taxes they pay on their foreign source income. If an in-
vestor's residence country were to employ such a system, a source country's
income tax would be borne, at least up to a point, by the residence country's
treasury.' This would be the clearest situation in which a country could im-
pose a source-based tax without restricting investment. 7
In conclusion, the economic burden of source-based taxation undoubt-
edly falls to some extent on immobile factors such as labor in the source
country, as optimal tax theory predicts, and to some extent on foreign in-
vestors and foreign governments, as refinements to the theory suggest. To
the extent that the burden of source-based taxation falls on foreign investors
and foreign governments, such taxation succeeds in increasing national eco-
203. KRUGMAN & OBMsrLD, supra note 140, at 232 (stating that, in practice, "optimal tariff'
argument is emphasized more by economists as theoretical proposition than it is used by governments as
justification for trade policy).
204. See Gordon, supra note 194, at 1163-64 (discussing this possibility, but noting that it does
not fully explain observed patterns of source-based taxation).
205. See id. at 1163; Charles E. McLure, Jr., Substituting Consumption-Based Direct Taxation
for Income Taxes as the International Norm, 45 NAT'L TAX J. 145, 148-49 (1992). Taken to its logical
conclusion, however, this possibility suggests that countries should not employ income taxes at all. See
Gordon, supra note 194, at 1163. Income taxes tax not only economic rents but also the normal return to
capital and thus discourage investment in the host country. If countries wanted to tax foreign firms without
restricting investment, they would have to employ cash-flow taxes instead of income taxes. Cash-flow taxes
allow the immediate deduction of all business-related expenditures, including purchases of depreciable
property and other expenditures that, under an income tax, must be capitalized and depreciated or amor-
tized over several years. The cash-flow tax does not tax the return to marginal investments but only the
return to inframarginal investments (economic rents) and thus does not discourage investment. The income
tax does tax the return to marginal investments as well as the return to inframarginal investments and thus
discourages investment. See McLure, supra, at 145-50.
206. See Slemrod, supra note 201, at 128-31; Summers, supra note 196, at 150-51.
207. See Slemrod, supra note 201, at 128. For example, the fact that the United States maintains
a foreign tax credit system probably accounts, at least historically, for Canada's employment of a source-
based income tax at about the same rate. See Robin Boadway, Corporate Tax Harmonisation: Lessons from
Canada, in BEYOND 1992: A EUROPEAN TAX SYSrEm (PROCEEDINGS OF TmE FouRTH IFS CONFERENCE)
52, 54 (Malcolm Gammie & Bill Robinson eds., 1989) (noting that as long as United States allows foreign
tax credit on corporate taxes paid by subsidiaries abroad, "Canada would be foolish not to tax these firms
on an origin basis and up to the limit of the allowable credit"). More generally, Professor Gordon has used
game theory to argue that the United States's dominance as a capital exporting country during much of the
postwar period and its maintenance of a foreign tax credit system might have contributed to the survival of
a nonzero equilibrium level of source-based income taxation in spite of the international mobility of capital.
See Gordon, supra note 194, at 1160. This cannot be a complete explanation for the existence of source-
based income taxes, however. Many residence countries employ exemption systems rather than foreign tax
credit systems. See Slemrod, supra note 201, at 129. Moreover, even where the residence country does
employ a foreign tax credit system, that system is unlikely fully to offset the source country's taxes on
account of other features of the tax system such as deferral and limitations on the foreign tax credit.
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nomic welfare because it transfers revenue from foreign investors and gov-
ernments to the source country's treasury-assuming, for the moment, that
the behavior of other countries is taken as given. But even to the extent that
the burden of source-based taxation falls on the source country's residents,
such taxation still might appeal to the source country's politicians.
First, source-based taxation of foreign firms generally is not investment-
restricting in the short run-foreign direct investment tends to be fixed in the
short run. Foreign firms generally cannot instantly move their physical in-
vestments from one country to another in response to tax changes. Politicians
therefore can tax the income from such investment and have the burden fall on
the foreign firms or on foreign treasuries in the short run. In the long run,
however, foreign investment will adjust to the taxes: The burden of the tax
will shift to the suppliers of immobile factors of production in the host coun-
try, and the investment distortions induced by the tax will reduce economic
welfare in the host country. The question, then, is whether the discounted fu-
ture costs exceed the present benefits. Even if they do not from the perspec-
tive of a country's residents, they might from the viewpoint of a politician,
who might discount the future heavily because of the short time between elec-
tions or because of the difficulty of claiming credit for long-term growth.
Moreover, politicians often desire to create fiscal illusion; that is, to in-
crease government revenues at no apparent cost to voters. High taxation of
foreign firms, even if it is ultimately investment-restricting, can achieve this
goal. Although the economic incidence of the tax will fall on domestic resi-
dents in the long run, the mechanism by which this occurs will be opaque to
most taxpayers, and the tax will appear to be borne both economically and le-
gally by foreign firms.
These considerations explain why politicians might have incentives to
impose high, discriminatory source-based taxes on foreign and foreign-
owned firms. As in the international trade context, these incentives can lead
to a prisoner's dilemma situation: The politicians in each country have an in-
centive to use high, discriminatory, source-based taxes to appropriate reve-
nue from residents of the other country or from the other country's treasury.
But if both nations follow this strategy, the result might be worse for both
than if they had "cooperated" and confined their source-based taxes to nor-
mal, nondiscriminatory levels. The two countries will end up simply appro-
priating revenue from one another. Their mutually predatory strategies could
cancel each other out if capital flows are roughly equal in the two directions.
But these strategies, however, also would restrict international trade and in-
vestment and impose potentially high enforcement and compliance costs, re-
sulting in a net loss to the welfare of both countries.
Although similar prisoner's dilemma outcomes manifest themselves in
the international trade and tax regimes, the political incentives that lead to
these outcomes are very different in the two contexts. As discussed in Sec-
tion A, politicians have an incentive to support tariffs and other import re-
strictions because they redistribute income from consumers to an organized
interest group: the domestic producers of products that compete with the im-
ports being restricted. In contrast, when countries break tax treaty rules re-
stricting source-based taxation, the violation typically will not occur because
of domestic interest group pressures. Unlike the case of trade restrictions, the
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distributional effects of income tax or other measures that restrict foreign di-
rect investment are complicated and imperfectly understood. 03 A very simple
model of inward foreign direct investment suggests that such investment re-
distributes income from domestic owners of capital as a group to domestic la-
bor as a group.2' Compared to international trade restrictions, however, in-
ternational tax rules that restrict inward foreign direct investment are unlikely
to have an impact that falls overwhelmingly on one narrowly defined industry.
Thus, both industry and labor groups are likely to experience collective action
problems when it comes to lobbying for or against international tax rules that
violate tax treaties. This is not to say that international tax rules that restrict
inward foreign direct investment do not sometimes result from specific lob-
bying by specific industries," ' but it does suggest that industries are much less
likely to seek protection through international tax measures than through
measures that more directly relate to international trade.
Rather than occurring in response to narrow interest group pressures,
tax treaty violations tend to result from politicians' incentives to raise reve-
nue from foreigners (as discussed above) or from domestic residents in a
way that hides the true cost of the policy. The violations that result from
these incentives are likely to be much broader than the targeted violations of
trade agreements that occur in response to concentrated interest group pres-
sure.
This feature of tax treaty violations has two important implications for
international cooperation in the tax regime. First, the employment of re-
taliatory strategies is likely to be much less suitable as a means of achieving
and maintaining cooperation in the tax context than in the trade context. In
the trade regime, trade agreement violations generally will be focused nar-
rowly to protect a single industry, and retaliatory strategies typically will fo-
cus on another single industry, which will respond by bringing countervail-
ing pressure on its government to cease the violation. In the tax context,
rules generally have broad applicability; moreover, tax treaty violations gen-
erally will be designed to raise as much revenue as possible and therefore
will tend to affect a broad spectrum of foreign and foreign-owned firms.
Other countries are likely to find it difficult to 'devise narrowly targeted re-
taliatory strategies that will create domestic interest group pressure in the
first country sufficient to offset this generalized desire to raise revenue.
Other countries might succeed if they were to employ broad-based retaliatory
strategies, but the risks would be very high compared to the risks of em-
ploying targeted retaliatory strategies in the trade context."' Thus, one
208. See RIcHARD E. CAVES, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 131-59
(2d ed. 1996) (discussing effects of foreign direct investment on income distribution and labor relations
from both theoretical and empirical perspectives); see also Edward M. Graham, Government Policies
Towards Inward Foreign Direct Investment: Effects on Producers and Consumers, in MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 176, 192-93 (Peter J. Buckley & Mark Casson eds., 1992)
(discussing effects of closed direct investment policies on home-based firms).
209. See CAVES, supra note 208, at 111.
210. Of course, tax rules that directly affect specific domestic industries (as opposed to tax rules
that are directed at foreign investment) are very often the result of just such lobbying. See, e.g., JEFFREY
H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT Guccl GULCH: LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE
UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1987); Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the
Accelerating Rate and Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913 (1987).
211. As reported by the Federal Income Tax Project:
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would not expect retaliatory strategies to be used frequently in the tax con-
text.
Second, the employment of retaliatory strategies is likely to be much
less necessary as a means of achieving and maintaining cooperation in the
tax context than it is in the trade context. A government contemplating a tax
treaty violation will know that its violation will have broad-based effects on
foreign interests, and it will also know that if other governments retaliate,
the retaliation similarly will have broad-based effects on the first country.
Violating a tax treaty therefore will be a very high-stakes gamble. Given the
risks, politicians will likely resist the incentives to violate the treaty in the
first place rather than giving in to the incentives, violating the treaty, and
seeing whether retaliation actually occurs.212
The empirical evidence supports this conclusion: It is extremely rare for
countries to retaliate in response to tax treaty violations. 213 The United States's
tax law does contain provisions authorizing retaliation against foreign coun-
tries whose income tax systems discriminate against U.S. citizens or corpora-
tions. Section 891 of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the President to
double the taxes imposed on citizens or corporations of foreign countries that
subject U.S. citizens or corporations to "discriminatory or extraterritorial
taxes." 214 In addition, section 896(b) empowers the President by proclamation
to adjust effective tax rates on citizens, residents, or corporations of foreign
countries that subject U.S. citizens or corporations to "a higher effective rate
of tax" than their own citizens or corporations. 215 Neither of these provisions
has ever been used.216
There is one instance in which the United States used section 301 to re-
taliate against a Canadian income tax provision.217 In 1976, Canada enacted a
While a partial termination [of a tax treaty] in response to a material breach is in theory
possible, there is no reported instance in which this has been done with respect to an in-
come tax treaty. Treaty partners have been understandably reluctant to take this action in
light of the potentially disruptive effects on such terminations on the settled pattern of inter-
national tax relationships.
FEDERAL INCOME TAX PRoJEcr, supra note 26, at 75; see also OECD Comm. on Fiscal Affairs, supra
note 127, 34 ("Member countries have so far refrained from taking retaliatory measures (which all agree
would not be conducive to better understanding in the international tax field) against overriding
legislation.").
212. The above analysis has focused on tax treaty rules that restrict source-based taxation. As
noted, tax treaties also contain rules that coordinate the domestic tax systems of the two treaty countries to
eliminate double taxation. These treaty rules are also likely to be relatively stable without the need for re-
taliatory strategies since they represent a solution to a coordination game. See, e.g., Abbott, supra note
136, at 371-74 (discussing coordination games played between states). Once players agree on a rule of co-
ordination, departing from it is likely to entail high costs. See id. at 373-74 (noting that "[o]nce a coordi-
nation regime is established, it will... tend to be self-enforcing; normally, a state can only hurt itself by
deviating from the agreed solution").
213. See supra note 211.
214. I.R.C. § 891 (1994). For a brief history of this provision, see Derek Devgun, International
Fiscal Wars for the Twenty-First Century: An Assessment of Tax-Based Trade Retaliation, 27 LAw &
POL'Y INT'L BUS. 353, 357-58 (1996).
215. See I.R.C. § 896(b) (1994). Devgun also provides history on this portion. See Devgun,
supra note 214, at 358.
216. See Devgun, supra note 214, at 358.
217. See id. at 356-57 (discussing incident); Andrew L. Stoler, The Border Broadcasting
Dispute: A Unique Case Under Section 301, 6 INT'L TRADE L.J. 39 (1981) (same). See generally Cynthia
S. Chegwidden, Treasury Supports Tax Retaliation Against Canada, 15 Tax Notes (Tax Analysts) 692
(May 24, 1982).
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provision that denied an income tax deduction for the cost of advertising paid
to U.S. television and radio broadcasting stations located near the U.S.-
Canada border for advertising aimed primarily at the Canadian market.218 A
group of U.S. television licensees petitioned for a section 301 investigation of
this measure, which the United States Trade Representative (USTR) initi-
ated.2 9 After consultations between the U.S. and Canadian governments failed
to lead to a mutually acceptable solution,' the President determined that the
Canadian tax measure was unreasonable and burdened and restricted U.S.
commerce within the meaning of section 301, and that the most appropriate
response was to propose legislation to Congress that would mirror the Cana-
dian measure in U.S. law."2 Congress enacted the proposed legislation in
1984 ,' but this instance of tax retaliation has been a conspicuous failure. The
retaliation was intended to pressure Canada to repeal its tax measure, but in-
stead both the discriminatory Canadian provision 2a and the discriminatory
U.S. response 2 remain in place. It seems plausible that retaliatory strategies
were used in this case precisely because the income tax measure in question
was directed at a specific industry. Thus, this isolated occurrence does not
suggest that retaliatory strategies are likely to be employed in the common
case where the tax measure is one of general applicability.
A more widely publicized instance of threats of income tax retaliation
occurred between the United Kingdom and the United States over California's
worldwide unitary income tax system.' California requires enterprises to al-
locate a portion of their total income to California using a formula based on
the proportion of the firm's total property, payroll, and sales located in the
state.' California combines this formula apportionment with "unitary" taxa-
tion. That is, it requires a group of corporations under common control and
engaging in interdependent operations to file a combined report. It then uses
formula apportionment to allocate a fraction of the group's combined income
to California. This unitary taxation is applied on a worldwide basis; that is,
foreign as well as domestic affiliates must be included in the combined report.
A number of foreign countries have strongly opposed the use of worldwide
unitary taxation as a method of determining the local taxable income of for-
eign-based multinational enterprises, principally on the grounds that it can re-
218. An Act to Amend the Income Tax Act, July 16, 1976, ch. 106, § 3, 1974-1975-1976 S.C.
2145 (Can.) (amending Income Tax Act by adding section 19.1).
219. See Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, 43 Fed. Reg. 39,617
(1978).
220. See Determination Under Section 301 of 1974, 45 Fed. Reg. 51,173 (1980).
221. See Presidential Determination Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Memorandum
for the United States Trade Representative, 45 Fed. Reg. 51,173 (1980).
222. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 § 232, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948, 2991 (amending
I.R.C. § 162G) to deny income tax deductions for costs of advertising primarily aimed at U.S. audiences
and placed on broadcast stations located in foreign country if similar deduction under income tax law of
that country is denied for advertising principally aimed at its audience and placed on U.S. broadcasting
stations).
223. Income Tax Act, R.S.C., ch. 1 (5th Supp.), § 19.1 (1985) (Can.).
224. I.R.C. § 1620) (1994).
225. See Devgun, supra note 214, at 366-72; Doemberg, Overriding Tax Treaties, supra note
127, at 128-30.
226. See JERoME R. HELLERsTEnl & WALTER HELwTEIn, STATE TAXAION: CORPORATE
INCOME AND FRANCHlSE TAXES 8.10(1), at 8-66 (2d ed. 1993).
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sult in double taxation of income and that it imposes heavy administrative bur-
dens on foreign taxpayers. 7
The United Kingdom, in particular, has been active since the 1970s in
opposing California's worldwide unitary income tax system.m In 1985, Par-
liament enacted legislation that authorized retaliation against corporations not
resident in the United Kingdom that maintained a "qualifying presence" in a
"unitary state" as identified by the U.K. Treasury. 29 This retaliation was to
be effected principally by unilaterally withdrawing certain tax credits that
would otherwise be due to the corporations in question under U.K. tax trea-
ties." In May 1993, the U.K. government set in motion the procedures to
designate California as a unitary state." In June 1993, the Inland Revenue
wrote to major U.S. corporations with subsidiaries in the United Kingdom as
well as directly to those subsidiaries, requesting information that presumably
would be used in connection with the threatened retaliation. 2 This crisis was
defused without the retaliatory legislation being put into effect when California
enacted and then broadened a "water's edge" election that permitted foreign
taxpayers to limit state taxation to income arising within U.S. borders 33 It is
not clear how instrumental the British threats of retaliation were in bringing
about these changes in California law; perhaps California would have changed
its law in any case.
This incident does indicate the potential for using retaliatory strategies in
response to general tax measures. It is also possible that there are other, less
publicized cases in which countries have employed retaliatory tax strategies."
227. For example, the governments of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom filed amici briefs in support of Barclays Bank in its
Supreme Court cases challenging California's worldwide unitary tax system. See Barclays Bank PLC v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 324 n.22 (1994).
228. For a brief discussion of the United Kingdom's unsuccessful efforts in the 1970s and 1980s
to negotiate an income tax treaty with the United States barring the use of worldwide unitary taxation and
to lobby Congress to enact legislation having the same effect, see Devgun, supra note 214, at 368-70.
229. Finance Act, 1985, § 54 & sched. 13 (U.K.), reenacted as Income and Corporation Taxes
Act, 1988, ch. 1, §§ 812-815 (U.K.). See generally Stephen E. Fiamma, U.K. Retaliation Against Unitary
Taxation, 28 Tax Notes (Tax Analysts) 1137 (Sept. 2, 1985) (providing overview of act's provisions and
discussing its effects).
230. See Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, ch. 1, § 812(1) (U.K.). In response to this
threatened treaty override, Senator Max Baucus introduced legislation in the Senate that would have
imposed federal income tax sanctions on corporations of a foreign country that used legislation designed to
retaliate against U.S. states' use of worldwide unitary taxation. See 131 CONG. REc. 31,327 (daily ed.
Nov. 12, 1985) (statement of Sen. Baucus).
231. See Alison Smith & Andrew Jack, UK Warns on Unitary Tax, FIN. TIMEs (London), May
14, 1993, at6.
232. See Julianne MacKinnon, Inland Revenue Warns U.S. Multinationals of Unitary Method
Retaliation, 6 Tax Notes Int'l (Tax Analysts) 1501, 1501 (June 21, 1993); John Turro, U.K. Inland
Revenue Infonns U.S. Firms' Subs About Retaliatory Legislation, 7 Tax Notes Int'l (Tax Analysts) 20, 20
(July 5, 1993).
233. See generally Eric J. CoffiU, A Kinder, Gentler "Water's Edge" Election, 7 Tax Notes Int'l
(Tax Analysts) 1049 (Oct. 25, 1993) (summarizing bill's provisions and outlining events leading to its
passage).
234. Professor Roin notes that U.S. congressional overrides of tax treaty obligations could be
viewed as a tit-for-tat response by the United States to earlier treaty violations committed by treaty
partners, such as the adoption of integrated tax systems that discriminate against U.S.-owned firms. See
Julie Roin, Rethinking Tax Treaties in a Strategic World with Disparate Tax Systems, 81 VA. L. Rnv.
1753, 1758 n.16 (1995). If so, this is certainly a much less explicit form of retaliation than that which
occurs in the trade context.
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This is particularly so since tax negotiations are often carried out between tax
officials who communicate directly with one another in secrecy. There would
have to be a considerable number of such unpublicized cases, however, for
international tax to come close to international trade in the frequency of resort
to retaliatory strategies. It is also possible that countries have employed en-
forcement-based retaliatory strategies. Governments can use otherwise neu-
tral tax laws as a means of discriminating against foreign firms by targeting
those firms for aggressive auditing and enforcement. Many observers suspect
that this has happened in the case of transfer pricing regulation. 5 The
United States has implemented a rigorous set of transfer pricing regulations,
enacted severe penalties for noncompliance, and stepped up enforcement
against foreign and foreign-owned firms engaging in business in the United
States. Other countries apparently have perceived these actions as an attempt
by the United States to grab revenues from foreign treasuries, and they have
reacted by threatening to adopt (or by actually adopting) similar measures in
retaliation. 6 It is difficult to determine how widespread enforcement-based
tax discrimination and retaliation are since it is difficult to distinguish be-
tween discriminatory enforcement and the normal use of a tax agency's
broad enforcement discretion to focus on cases in which it believes it can
obtain the most revenue. For the same reason, it would be difficult for a le-
galistic dispute settlement system to deal effectively with disputes involving
allegations of discriminatory enforcement.
In conclusion, the available evidence strongly suggests that the use of
retaliatory strategies in the tax area, although not unheard of, is extremely
rare. Thus, there does not appear to be a strong argument for including legal-
istic dispute settlement procedures in tax treaties if the purpose of these proce-
dures is to manage retaliatory strategies.
Rather than stopping here, however, one must consider the alternative of
covering at least some income tax measures (such as discriminatory measures)
under trade agreements, as trade negotiators from virtually all countries except
the United States wanted during the Uruguay Round negotiations. This alter-
native to including legalistic dispute settlement procedures in tax treaties
would create an explicit linkage between tax treaty obligations and trade
agreement obligations and possibly expand the scope of possible retaliation.
For example, one country could retaliate against another country's discrimi-
natory tax measure by raising a tariff on one of the second country's exports.
This strategy would facilitate more narrowly targeted retaliation, which might
make retaliatory strategies more effective in maintaining compliance with tax
235. For a brief discussion of transfer pricing regulation, see supra notes 89-91 and accompany-
ing text.
236. See Sunghak Andrew Baik & Michael Patton, Japan Steps Up Transfer Pricing Enforce-
ment: Joins the APA Fray, 11 Tax Notes Int'l (Tax Analysts) 1271, 1271 (Nov. 13, 1995) (noting that
r[miany observers have commented that [Japan's new transfer pricing] policy's real objective was to go
after foreign-affiliated companies active in Japan as a form of 'retaliatory taxation' vis-A-vis the U.S. sec-
tion 482 regulations"); Haroldene F. Wunder & Stephen R. Crow, International Tax Reform Since 1986:
An Update, 14 Tax Notes Int'l (Tax Analysts) 1163, 1165 (Apr. 7, 1997) (noting that "more than one
country... threatened conformity as a retaliatory measure" in response to new U.S. transfer pricing sta n-
dards and penalties, which "were seen by the retaliatory country as a way for the United States to transfer
funds from a competing national treasury").
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treaty obligations. There are several potential problems with this approach,
however.
First, this tactic raises issues of institutional competence. A traditional
concern of GATT pragmatists has been that countries would bring GATT
complaints that presented issues beyond the decisionmaking capacity of the
panel procedure, resulting in bad decisions with which members would not
comply. 7 The DISC case, in which a panel found that European territorial
tax systems as well as the U.S. DISC legislation violated GATT obligations,
is often cited as the classic example of such a case."
If income tax disputes were added to the WTO's agenda, however, there
is no reason why the WTO could not develop the necessary competence. At
the panel stage, the GATT Secretariat could propose international tax experts
as panel members. It also could retain international tax experts, on either a
permanent or an ad hoc basis, to provide legal assistance to the panel. 9 If the
dispute progressed to the Appellate Body, the problem of institutional compe-
tence would be more difficult to solve. The Appellate Body has only seven
members; appeals are heard by panels consisting of three of the members. It is
highly unlikely that any members of the Appellate Body would be experts in
international taxation.2" As at the panel stage, however, the GATT Secretariat
could provide the Appellate Body with the assistance of international tax ex-
perts. In any case, the GATT increasingly will have to deal with disputes that
raise issues outside its traditional core competence-for example, issues raised
by the new Uruguay Round agreements on product standards, services, trade
related investment measures, and intellectual property. Moreover, this prob-
lem is not peculiar to the international trade context. Many international as
well as national judicial bodies have to decide cases in complex areas in which
the judges lack subject matter expertise.241 The parties then have the responsi-
bility to educate the judges.
A more serious difficulty with permitting trade retaliation against
breaches of tax obligations involves the problem of legitimacy. The legitimacy
of retaliation appears to depend on how closely related the retaliation is to the
237. See Hudec, supra note 3, at 163-66.
238. See id.
239. It is widely believed that such legal assistance is extremely important to the success of the
panel process. The greatest improvement in the quality of GATT legal decisions over the last decade has
come from creating a legal staff in the GATT Secretariat, and reinforcing that legal staff would probably be
the most effective contribution to the quality of GATT legal practice in the immediate future. See Hudec,
supra note 49, at 1508.
240. The Appellate Body.is to comprise "persons of recognized authority, with demonstrated ex-
pertise in law, international trade and the subject matter of the covered agreements generally." Dispute
Settlement Understanding, supra note 1, art. 17(3). Income taxation arguably falls within the scope of this
language. But even if income tax measures were brought more generally under the coverage of the GATT,
it is unlikely that income tax disputes would constitute more than a small fraction of the GATT dispute se t-
tlement system's docket. Thus, even with such a change, Appellate Body members would much more
likely be chosen for general international trade expertise than for specialized international tax expertise.
241. The argument that the GAIT dispute settlement system should not hear international tax
disputes because of lack of competence parallels the argument that appellate jurisdiction in tax cases should
be moved from the U.S. courts of appeal to a specialist tax court of appeals-an argument that has not
prevailed. See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., JUDIcIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE
FEDERAL COUtmS STUDY COMM=TrE 69-70 (1990) (recommending creation of Article M appellate
division of United States Tax Court with exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in federal income, estate, and
gift tax cases; arguing that this proposal would increase quality of tax adjudication by shifting it to court of
"highly trained specialists").
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initial breach. 242 It is unlikely that trade retaliation against a breach of a tax
obligation would be perceived to be as legitimate as trade retaliation against a
breach of a trade obligation. The legitimacy of retaliation also appears to de-
pend on the degree of equivalence or proportionality between the retaliation
and the initial breach.243 It would be difficult to make this comparison in the
case of trade retaliation against a tax breach.
Of course, trade retaliation that was approved by a decision of a third
party panel or neutral appellate body might have greater legitimacy than uni-
lateral tax retaliation, such as occurred in the U.S.-Canada case and was
threatened in the U.S.-U.K. case, discussed previously. Nevertheless, inter-
national tax regime maintenance based on trade retaliation against tax treaty
breaches is unlikely to be as effective as international trade regime mainte-
nance based on trade retaliation against trade agreement breaches.
V. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AS A MEANS
OF GENERATING AND DISSEMINATING INFORMATION
Part IV discussed the role of dispute settlement mechanisms as devices
for managing retaliatory strategies. This approach was based on viewing the
underlying international regime as a prisoner's dilemma. In the single-play
prisoner's dilemma, each player is better off cheating, regardless of what the
other player does. In the repeated-play prisoner's dilemma, however, the
players can achieve cooperation through the adoption of retaliatory strategies.
This approach is not without problems. There are theoretical reasons for
questioning the usefulness of retaliatory strategies as a means of maintaining
compliance with international treaty norms, even in the context of interna-
tional trade, where such strategies are prevalent. One problem is that countries
likely will have an inadequate incentive to carry through on their retaliatory
strategies. Retaliation is costly. Retaliatory trade restrictions, for example,
generally reduce the national economic welfare of the country imposing the
restrictions. 2' A country's desire to preserve good diplomatic relations also
242. See Avinash Dixit, How Should the United States Respond to Other Countries' Trade
Policies?, in U.S. TRADE PouciEs IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY 245, 271-72 (Robert M. Stem ed.,
1987). Professor Dixit gives the example of the United States threatening to abandon its defense
commitment to Europe or Japan as a way of achieving economic aims. He argues: "In practice ethics and
credibility demand a closer link between the threat and the action to be deterred. In fact it is largely the
perceived impropriety of an unrelated response that makes the adversary think that it will never be used
and so removes its credibility." Id. at 272.
243. The enforcement model of retaliation suggests that the normative considerations that apply to
punishments in general should be applicable to retaliatory sanctions. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note
171, at 106. It is widely believed that morally legitimate punishments must be proportional to the offenses
for which they are administered. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, THE MErAPHYSICAL ELEMENTs OF JUSTICE
*332. Consistent with this view, both the GATT and U.S. trade law require that retaliatory sanctions be
proportionate to the "nullification or impairment" of GATT obligations to which they respond. See Dispute
Settlement Understanding, supra note 1, art. 22(4) (mandating that level of retaliation authorized by DSB
shall be "equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment"); 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(3) (1994)
(mandating that retaliatory section 301 sanctions be devised so as to cause harm to offending trading
partner in amount equivalent to harm inflicted on United States by unfair trade practice under
investigation).
244. See Robert E. Hudec, Thinking About the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil, in
AGGREsswE UNLATERALiSM 113, 138 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990) (noting that
retaliation generally "inflicts nearly as much pain upon one's own importers and users as it does on
exporter interests on the other side"); Young, supra note 13, at 408 (noting that trade sanctions frequently
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might cause it to forbear retaliating against certain violators.245 This incentive
problem becomes worse when the initial breach of a treaty obligation affects
more than one country, as often will be the case.6 Given the costs of retalia-
tion, each country will have an incentive to free ride, leaving retaliation to
other countries.247 As a result, retaliatory strategies generally will not be com-
pletely credible and thus will tend to be insufficient to induce compliance.
A related problem is that, in practice, retaliation will tend to have an ad
hoc character. In deciding whether to incur the costs of retaliating, countries
inevitably will take into account a wide range of political and diplomatic con-
siderations. Retaliation will be most likely to occur when the costs are small
and the likelihood of success is great. Such might be the case when the retali-
ating country is large and the target is smallY58 These features will undermine
the legitimacy of retaliatory strategies, reducing their effectiveness as a means
of regime management. 249
These observations suggest that there might be a different, or additional,
explanation for international cooperation. Perhaps the characterization of the
international regime as a prisoner's dilemma underestimates the prospects for
achieving international cooperation."
Some international relations theorists and international legal scholars
have argued that countries have a propensity to comply with international
agreements that they have signed, even apart from the fear of specific retalia-
tion that leads to cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma. There are a
number of grounds for finding such an assumption plausible. The first, which
is by no means universally accepted, is that governments are constrained by a
moral sense of "international obligation. " "
Second, governments fear that their own treaty violations will create
precedents that will weaken the force of treaty commitments generally, in-
creasing the likelihood that other countries will breach their commitments in
the future. 2 This concern is unlikely to be a completely effective deterrent,
"hurt the country enforcing the sanction almost as much as it hurts the country against which the sanction
is imposed").
245. See Shell, supra note 140, at 901-02.
246. Although tax treaties are bilateral, countries generally enter into a network of similar treaties
with a number of countries. A tax measure that breaches one treaty will therefore often breach many others
as well.
247. See KEoHmE, supra note 138, at 105 (noting that, because of collective action problems, "if
a given state's violation of a particular rule does not have a large effect on any one country, retaliation is
unlikely to be severe, even if the aggregate effect of the violation is large"); Abbott, supra note 136, at 367
(discussing free rider problems in regime maintenance through retaliation); Shell, supra note 140, at 901-
02.
248. See Young, supra note 13, at 408.
249. See CHAYEs & CHAYEs, supra note 171, at 106-08.
250. The payoff structure of a regime can change over time as events take place and the actors'
perceptions of their interests change. Thus, a regime might be represented by a prisoner's dilemma at one
time, by a more conflictual game such as deadlock at another time, and by a less conflictual game such as
the assurance game, see infra note 260, at yet another time. See Robert Axelrod & Robert 0. Keohane,
Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions, in NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERAI[SM:
THm COIrEMPORARY DEBATE, supra note 137, at 85, 87-91.
251. See CHAYES & CRAmEs, supra note 171, at 3-4. Although the "realist" conception of states
as rational, self-interested actors denies the existence of a normative sense of "international obligation,"
many foreign policy practitioners operate on the assumption that governments do, in fact, acknowledge an
obligation to comply with the international agreements they have signed. See id.
252. See KEoHANE, supra note 138, at 105; see also FEDERAL INCOME TAX PRoJECr, supra note
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however, because of collective action problems. A country will have an in-
centive to violate a treaty if it expects that its own gain from the violation will
exceed the harm that it alone experiences as a result of the weakened re-
gime. 3 Optimal deterrence, however, would require a comparison of the gain
to the breaching country with the harm to all regime members.
Third, treaty rules serve as rules of thumb,' and it is normally efficient
to adhere to such rules. 5 When countries enter into treaty obligations, they
make an initial calculation that the expected benefits of compliance exceed the
expected costs. Thereafter, it is an inefficient use of a country's limited deci-
sionmaking resources to engage in a continual recalculation of expected bene-
fits and costs. Absent exceptional circumstances, it makes more sense to as-
sume that the initial calculation remains valid and to continue to adhere to the
rule. Moreover, the adoption of rules of thumb enables decisions to be dele-
gated to lower-level officials; these officials are very likely to comply with the
rules that their superiors have directed them to follow.
Finally, and most importantly, countries tend to comply with interna-
tional rules because of concern for their reputation. z 6 A country's reputation
provides the most reliable information about its willingness and ability to keep
its commitments. The importance of reputation is suggested by analogy to the
"market for lemons" problem in microeconomic theory. One can show that if
sellers of used cars are unable to convey reliable information about the quality
of their cars to potential buyers, the market can break down to the point where
good used cars will not be bought and sold. 7 Analogously, the "market" for
international agreements can break down if countries lack reliable information
about the willingness and ability of their potential treaty partners to keep their
commitments. In the absence of information, nations might fail to make
agreements that are in all of their interests.
26, at 78 ("The benefits of a broad and stable international consensus as to principles of taxation may be
lost if treaties are debased in value.").
253. See KEOHANE, supra note 138, at 105.
254. See id. at 115-16.
255. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 171, at 4.
256. See KEoHANE, supra note 138, at 105-06 (explaining importance of reputation as incentive
to conform to standards of behavior in world politics); Abbott, supra note 136, at 402-03 (noting that
performance of breach of obligation may be "capitalized" into reputation and considered by rational states
in future negotiations).
257. Suppose that the only reliable way to tell whether a used car is a good car or a "lemon" is to
own it for a length of time. This information will be available asymmetrically. Owner-sellers of used cars
will have it, but buyers will not. Suppose that a good car is worth $10,000 to a seller and $12,000 to a
buyer; a lemon is worth $5,000 to a seller and $6,000 to a buyer. If a used car on the market were equally
likely to be a good car or a lemon, a risk-neutral buyer would be willing to pay at most $9,000 for a used
car. At that price, however, no owners of good cars would be willing to sell. Thus, only lemons would be
placed on the market. Buyers would soon realize this and then would be willing to pay at most $6,000 for a
used car, knowing that it would be a lemon.
The result is a market failure. No good cars will be bought and sold, even though both buyers and
sellers would be better off if good cars changed hands at any price between $10,000 and $12,000. The
problem is that sellers have no way of reliably conveying information about the quality of their cars to
buyers. If a seller repeatedly sold used cars, however, it would be in his interest to develop and maintain a
reputation for honestly representing the quality of his cars. Doing so would create a market for good cars.
See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84
Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). For discussions of the "market for lemons" problem in the context of international
relations, see KEoHANE, supra note 138, at 193-94; and Abbott, supra note 136, at 402-03.
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This analysis suggests that three types of information are important for
the maintenance of cooperative outcomes. The first is information about the
meaning of ambiguous treaty mles." If countries have a propensity to comply
with the international agreements that they have signed, then compliance gen-
erally will be forthcoming provided that the rules are clear. Reduction of am-
biguity is also important because it facilitates a common understanding of
treaty norms among countries making independent decisions.
In principle, treaty rules can be clarified through renegotiation of the
treaty. The renegotiation process is extremely slow and cumbersome,"s9 how-
ever, requiring attention at the highest political levels in the countries in-
volved. It is therefore not a suitable method for resolving most ambiguities
that arise in the routine course of international relations. A dispute settlement
mechanism can resolve these ambiguities with lower transaction costs. Reso-
lution of disputes through ad hoc political compromise, however, will not
adequately generate and disseminate information about the requirements of the
regime. Instead, it is necessary to have a legalistic system that produces
precedents.
A second type of information that is necessary for international coopera-
tion is information about parties' performance and intentions under the re-
gime. If one assumes that countries have a propensity to comply with their
treaty obligations, the treaty regime resembles the "assurance game" or "stag
hunt" rather than the prisoner's dilemma.' This game is based on the fol-
lowing parable. 1 The members of a primitive society can hunt stags or hunt
rabbits. All must cooperate to kill a stag, but a single hunter can kill a rabbit.
If the group kills a stag, each member will eat well, but if the members hunt
rabbits instead, they will eat poorly. Now suppose that while the group is
hunting for a stag, a rabbit jumps out. If every member of the group cooper-
ates and ignores the rabbit, the group will eventually kill a stag. But if any one
member defects to pursue the rabbit, the remaining group will be unable to
kill a stag; each member will then be reduced to hunting rabbits. In this situa-
tion, no member of the group has an incentive to defect as long as he or she is
258. C. FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECr, supra note 26, at 95 (noting that "income tax treaties
are articulated in broad conceptual terms and employ words and phrases that often are unlike those used in
domestic law").
259. In the case of the GATT, negotiating rounds typically require many years to complete. The
Kennedy Round required five years (1962-67), the Tokyo Round six years (1973-79), and the Uruguay
Round eight years (1986-94). See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 13, at 292. The provisions for amending the
pre-Uruguay Round GAIT were so difficult to satisfy that the Uruguay Round Agreements were
structured as a wholly new treaty rather than as amendments to the GATT. See id. at 313. The provisions
for amending the Uruguay Round Agreements are similar; therefore, amending these agreements is likely
to continue to be difficult, too. See id.
260. The assurance game has the following payoff structure:
County IY
Cooperate Defect
C I Cooperate 4,4 1,3
Defect 3,1 2,2
For a discussion of stag hunt game in the context of international relations theory, see Abbott, supra note
136, at 368-70.
261. Seeid. at 368 n.174.
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sure that the other members of the group also will cooperate. But if he or she
is not sure that the other members of the group will cooperate, he or she
might be better off defecting.
Unlike the situation in the prisoner's dilemma, no player in this assur-
ance game has an incentive to take advantage of the other player by defecting,
as long as he or she believes that the other player also will cooperate. If one
player believes that another will defect, however, an incentive to defect will
exist for purely defensive reasons. As long as each player is confident that the
other players share a common understanding of the game and its preferences,
the outcome will be mutually beneficial cooperation. If information about the
other player's understandings and preferences is incomplete or incorrect,
however, each player rationally might be suspicious of the other, leading to
the possibility of a breakdown in cooperation. Maintenance of cooperation
therefore requires that each player receive continual assurances that the other
player is cooperating.
A legalistic dispute settlement system can provide some of this assurance
information-in particular, information about the requirements of the regime
and about other parties' performance under the regime. In addition, such a
system can provide information to domestic political actors about how other
countries perceive their actions. In the absence of such information, the treaty
norms might have so little prominence that they are ignored in the domestic
political process. The commencement of a dispute settlement proceeding will
raise the prominence of the treaty norm and also will create a series of op-
portunities for placing the allegedly breaching measure back on the political
agenda for reconsideration.
In the international trade context, it can be very difficult to generate and
disseminate the types of information discussed above without the use of a le-
galistic dispute settlement system. Trade disputes often present difficult prob-
lems of characterization because breaches of trade agreements often take the
form of "disguised" restrictions on trade. In particular, they can take the form
of facially nondiscriminatory internal regulations of seemingly non-trade-
related subjects such as environmental protection or consumer safety. Such
regulations nevertheless might have the effect of placing greater burdens on
imports than on domestically produced goods. Such restrictions present diffi-
cult questions of interpretation. Are they consistent with the trade agreement?
If not, do they signal a general unwillingness or inability to comply? Or do
they represent an understandable reaction to new circumstances rather than a
fundamental breakdown in the cooperative equilibrium? Legalistic dispute set-
tlement mechanisms help generate the information necessary to answer these
questions. In the dispute settlement process, the country that is alleged to have
breached the treaty is called upon to defend its actions. If a neutral dispute
settlement system determines that the action in question is consistent with
treaty obligations, this will help provide the necessary assurance to the com-
plaining country. If the system determines that the action constitutes a breach,
however, then the breaching country will know that it has to provide addi-
tional assurance of its intentions and capabilities in order to maintain the co-
operative relationship. This will give the breaching country a strong incentive
to bring its action into compliance with the treaty or at least to provide assur-
ance that the breach is explained by exceptional circumstances.
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In contrast, income tax measures that arguably conflict with income tax
treaties are usually much more transparent. They generally will be included in
a country's income tax code rather than in some seemingly unrelated statute.
At least in the case of the United States, it is likely that the issue of the con-
sistency of a measure with tax treaties will have been raised during the legis-
lative process 2 and that the legislative history will have addressed this is-
sue.26 Thus, even without a legalistic dispute settlement system for tax dis-
putes, other countries easily can become aware of the measure2' and learn the
United States's justification for it. I
In addition, at least in the case of OECD countries, OECD studies can
substitute for legalistic dispute settlement as a means of generating the infor-
mation necessary to facilitate the role of international obligation, precedent,
and reputation in maintaining international tax cooperation. Recent examples
are OECD studies of the consistency of transfer pricing rules and thin capitali-
zation rules with the OECD Model Tax Convention's arm's length standard
and nondiscrimination obligation2 6 and an OECD study of the problem of
treaty overrides generally.' Although the GATT has provisions for surveil-
lance,267 this mechanism is likely to be less effective in the trade area than in
the tax area because of the multiplicity of domestic regulations that affect
trade and because of their lack of transparency.
VI. THE COSTS OF LEGALISTIC DISPUTE SETTLEMENT FROM THE
PERSPECTIVE OF REGIME MAINTENANCE
Parts IV and V of this Article argued that legalistic dispute settlement
systems can facilitate cooperation by managing retaliatory strategies; by pro-
viding information about the requirements of a regime, the performance of
parties under the regime, and the reactions of other parties; and by facilitating
262. The Treasury Department often raises the issue of potential conflicts between proposed
legislation and treaty commitments. For example, Treasury urged Congress not to adopt the treaty-
overriding limitation-of-benefits provisions of the branch profits tax in order to give Treasury an
opportunity to renegotiate existing treaties that do not contain effective treaty shopping prohibitions. See
N.Y. St. B. Ass'n, supra note 127, at 931.
263. See, e.g., H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 101-386, at 569-70 (1989) (arguing that "earnings
stripping" provision enacted as section 1630) of Code is consistent with arm's length standard), reprinted
in 4 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3018, 3172-73 (1989).
264. Several recent U.S. treaties contain provisions requiring a competent authority to consult
with the other competent authority with a view to establishing a basis for the full implementation of the
treaty, if the first competent authority becomes aware that a domestic law may be applied in a manner that
may impede the full implementation of the treaty. See U.S.-Netherlands Treaty, supra note 106, art. 29(6);
U.S.-Mexico Treaty, supra note 105, protocol, para. 20, at 70.
265. See OECD TRANSFER PRCING GuIEmiNES, supra note 2, paras. 1.1-1.5, at I-1 to 1-2;
OECD, 2 IssuEs IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, THIN CAPTALUSATION: TAXATION OF ENTERTAINERS,
ARTISTES AND SPORTSMEN 29-32 (1987) [hereinafter OECD, THN CAPrrALISATION]. The OECD plans to
review regularly the issue of thin capitalization in future supplements to the Guidelines. See Preface to
OECD TRANSFER PmCING GUIDEUNES, supra note 2, para. 19, at P-6.
266. See OECD Comm. on Fiscal Affairs, supra note 127.
267. See, e.g., CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 171, at 244-46 (outlining GATT surveillance
procedures); HUDC, supra note 9, at 194-95 (discussing development of surveillance provisions); JOHN
H. JACKSON, RESRUCfURING THE GATT SYsrEM 79-80 (1990) (discussing policy goals of surveillance
provisions); Davey, supra note 3, at 107-08 (questioning merits of establishing surveillance procedures);
Hudec, supra note 3, at 168-70 (detailing genesis of and policy considerations behind development of
surveillance provisions).
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the development and dissemination of reputation. Parts IV and V analyzed
these functions in the contexts of both international trade and international tax,
concluding that legalistic dispute settlement is much more important to the
maintenance of cooperation in the trade context than in the tax context. Re-
taliatory strategies are prevalent in the international trade context, and the
need to manage them was apparent to most countries during the Uruguay
Round negotiations. In the international tax context, however, such strategies
are likely to be ineffective; indeed, they are seldom used in practice. Simi-
larly, because of the "disguised" nature of many international trade restric-
tions, the information described above tends to be difficult to generate and dis-
seminate in the international trade context except through legalistic dispute
settlement. In the tax context, however, there tends to be greater transparency,
so the relevant information is likely to be available without legalistic dispute
settlement.
This Part of the Article turns to the cost side of the equation. Legalistic
dispute settlement imposes costs on an international regime as well as pro-
ducing benefits. These include not only the obvious costs of administering the
system, but, more significantly, the costs that arise because legalistic dispute
settlement can weaken the stability of the cooperative regime. In assessing the
appropriateness of a legalistic dispute settlement system in the context of a
given regime, one must weigh the expected benefits against the expected
costs. This Part concludes that the potential costs of legalistic dispute settle-
ment are substantial, both in the international trade context and in the interna-
tional tax context; if anything, they are greater in the tax context.
A. "Poisoning the Atmosphere"
A longstanding concern of international trade "pragmatists" is that le-
galistic dispute settlement procedures are more confrontational and adversarial
than diplomatic procedures and that the use of legalistic procedures therefore
will tend to undermine friendly relationships. 8 This, in turn, will tend to un-
dermine compliance with international agreements, since compliance is more
likely if the parties to the agreement maintain amicable relations among them-
selves. Pragmatists also argue that it is undesirable that legalistic dispute set-
tlement ultimately produces a clear ruling in favor of one side or the other,
given that the parties are locked in an ongoing relationship.269 Unless the rul-
ing is acceptable to the losing party, it is likely to undermine that relationship.
Indeed, even in the domestic context, it is widely recognized that litigation is
far more likely to occur when there is no ongoing relationship between the
parties or where such a relationship has definitively terminated.Y0
This concern might be overstated, however. Even with a legalistic dis-
pute settlement system in place, the great majority of disputes will likely be
settled amicably in the "shadow of the law" established by the legalistic sys-
tem. Therefore, while this concern should be given some weight, it seems un-
likely by itself to tip the balance against legalistic dispute settlement in any re-
268. See CHAYEs & CHAYES, supra note 171, at 205-06.
269. See id.
270. See id. at 206.
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gime. Moreover, this cost would be similar in both the trade context and the
tax context.
B. Noncompliance
Trade pragmatists also have been concerned that the clear rulings of a
legalistic dispute settlement system will lead to equally clear cases of noncom-
pliance.27' Inevitably, the political forces that led a country to breach the
agreement in the first place sometimes will prove so powerful that the country
will refuse to comply with an adverse ruling from a dispute settlement body.272
If such outcomes become commonplace, the conspicuous failure of the dispute
settlement system will threaten to destroy the prestige of the regime.
Refusals to comply with legalistic dispute settlement rulings might be
even more of a problem in the tax context than in the trade context. Arguably,
politicians might view dispute settlement rulings on international tax matters
as intruding more on domestic sovereignty than do rulings on international
trade matters.273 Countries generally agree on the benefits of free trade but
disagree widely about optimal tax policy, which involves tradeoffs among
such objectives as economic efficiency, fairness, and administrative feasibil-
ity, and which depends on each country's economic and social structure.274
Countries depend on taxation not only to raise revenue but also as an instru-
ment of economic and social policy. Compliance with an international dispute
settlement ruling on tax matters therefore could have devastating consequences
to a government.
For the most part, however, tax treaties constrain only one aspect of
taxation: the manner in which it applies to foreign persons.27 The rulings of
271. See Hudec, supra note 3, at 159-66.
272. See id. at 159.
273. Cf. FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, supra note 26, at 63-80 (noting congressional
sensitivity to treaty intrusions on United States's unilateral prerogatives to tax as it wishes); CoMMISON
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INDEPENDENT EXPERTS ON COMPANY
TAXATION 45 (1992) (noting that member states of European Community "remain extremely reluctant to
cede any of their sovereignty in tax matters to Community"); OECD, TRANSFER PRICING AND
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 81, para. 55, at 59 (stating that several member countries of
OECD have made it clear that they would find a system of mandatory arbitration of transfer pricing
disputes unacceptable because it would involve unprecedented surrender of fiscal sovereignty); Slemrod,
supra note 194, at 305 (noting that one obstacle to multilateral tax coordination "is that countries are
unwilling to cede sovereignty over such an important element of domestic policy").
274. In contrasting trade agreements and tax agreements, Professor Slemrod argues:
In the case of tariffs, there exists a clear benchmark goal of zero tariffs, a goal which does
not severely compromise the revenue needs of most countries. In the case of tax policy,
countries differ enormously in their revenue requirements, capacity to raise taxes, and their
predisposition toward alternative tax systems, including the perceived need to use tax policy
to affect economic activity. For this reason I see no prospect for a comprehensive interna-
tional agreement that sets severe limits on tax policy.
Joel Slemrod, Tar Principles in an International Econony, in WORLD TAX REFORM: CASE STtUDIES OF
DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 11, 21 (Michael J. Boskin & Charles E. McLure, Jr. eds.,
1990).
275. U.S. tax treaties generally contain a "saving clause," which typically provides that "a
Contracting State may tax its residents (as determined under Article 4 (Residence)), and by reason of
citizenship may tax its citizens, as if the Convention had not come into effect." U.S. DEP'T. OF THE
TREASURY, MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION, supra note 84, art. 1(4). There are exceptions to the saving
clause, however. See id. art. 1(5). For example, the United States generally makes a treaty commitment to
continue to provide its residents and citizens with relief from double taxation of their foreign source income
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an international tax dispute settlement body usually would not require a coun-
try to change the way it taxes its own residentsY 6 Arguably, this is no more
of a constraint on sovereignty than GATT obligations, particularly insofar as
the latter constrain the government's freedom to adopt internal regulations re-
lating to goods and services. Because of concern that GATT dispute settle-
ment panels might strike down U.S. consumer safety, environmental protec-
tion, and other laws and regulations as "disguised restrictions on trade," Con-
gress specified that, under domestic law, the WTO/GATT Agreement would
not preempt federal law and that it would preempt state law only in the case of
an action brought by the United States. 2' Even in the case of a federal chal-
lenge to state law, GATT dispute settlement body rulings have no effect under
domestic law.27 Potentially, WTO/GATT decisions could even strike down
domestic measures relating to national security, raising the greatest possible
sovereignty concerns. For example, the European Union has filed a complaint
in the WTO contending that certain provisions of the United States's Helms-
Burton Act violate the GATT. 9 The central controversy relates to provisions
of the Act that impose penalties on foreign persons who knowingly "traffic"
in U.S. property confiscated by Fidel Castro's regime. When a WTO panel
was formed to examine this complaint, U.S. officials declared that the United
States would not even appear before the panel, arguing that the WTO "has no
competence to proceed because this is a matter of U.S. national security and
foreign policy."' It is not clear, however, that the United States is correct
that the mere invocation of national security is sufficient to remove the mat-
ter from the WTO's jurisdiction. The GATT does contain a national security
exception,"' but it is written narrowly.' Arguably, the WTO at minimum has
jurisdiction to interpret the national security exception to determine whether it
applies in a given case. If so, even disputes that raise national security con-
cerns could become subject to GATT adjudication.
through a foreign tax credit mechanism. See id. art. 23.
276. In at least one case, however, the U.S. Congress arguably has overridden one of its tax
treaty obligations as a residence country. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 introduced a new alternative
minimum tax and limited the foreign tax credits usable against this tax obligation to 90% of the amount of
the tax due. Congress made clear that this provision was to override any obligation under a tax treaty to
relieve double taxation. See Pending Bilateral Tax Treaties and OECD Tax Convention: Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong. 13 (1990) (statement of Kenneth W. Gideon,
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy).
277. See supra note 26.
278. See supra note 27.
279. See World Trade Organization, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European
Communities, supra note 31.
280. Rossella Brevetti et al., U.S. Says WTO Not Competent to Judge Cuba Dispute, 14 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 351, 351 (1997) (quoting Stuart Eizenstat, Undersecretary of Commerce for
International Trade); see also David E. Sanger, U.S. Won't Offer Trade Testimony on Cuba Embargo,
N.Y. Tt , Feb. 21, 1997, at Al (same).
281. See GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. 21.
282. In particular, the national security exception applies to any action that a member
(b)... considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests
relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such
traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the
purpose of supplying a military establishment; [or]
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations ....
Id. art. 21(b).
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A more critical distinction than the one based on sovereignty concerns
might be that, in the international trade context, politicians often might want
to lose cases in the dispute settlement process.Y Politicians typically have
conflicting motives. A politician might want to promote free trade because of
pressure from export producing interests, because it enhances the country's
aggregate economic welfare, because it is a policy favored by "elites," or for
any number of other reasons.' At the same time, the politician might find it
difficult to resist the demands for protection asserted by import-competing in-
terests. Trade agreements are a way of "solving" this internal dilemma. The
politician gets free trade and can deflect interest group demands for protection
in the future by claiming that the agreement leaves no choice.
This mechanism will not be completely effective, however, if dispute
settlement is based on diplomatic negotiation. In close cases, where there is a
reasonable, albeit weak, argument that a particular measure is not a breach of
the agreement, politicians might come under pressure to enact the measure
and attempt to defend it, perhaps ultimately reaching a compromise that does
not involve removing the offending measure. If the trade agreement contains
effective legalistic dispute settlement procedures, however, the politician can
resist on the ground that the weak argument supporting the measure almost
certainly will lose in the end and that the dispute settlement body will demand
removal of the measure. Thus, a trade agreement backed up with legalistic
dispute settlement procedures generally enables politicians to deflect the blame
for the dislocations caused by free trade to an international organization.
Measures that violate tax treaties, in contrast, seldom will be driven by
narrow interest group pressures that a politician might prefer to resist. Instead,
politicians often will enact such measures as a way of solving short-term
budgetary problems without encountering strong domestic opposition. An ad-
verse dispute settlement body ruling would force the politicians to look for
other means of achieving this objective. Thus, politicians might welcome le-
galistic dispute settlement procedures in the trade context, but they are un-
likely to do so in the tax context.
C. Lack of Legitimacy
A legalistic dispute settlement system is likely to promote cooperation by
clarifying treaty norms only if countries perceive the resulting interpretation of
the norms to be legitimate. Legitimacy generally results if the domestic politi-
cal process accepts the outcome. In the case of domestic litigation (not in-
volving constitutional issues), there is a political check on the outcome: The
legislature can overrule a politically unacceptable judicial decision.Y Legalis-
tic international dispute settlement procedures do not provide any such politi-
283. See Shell, supra note 140, at 900.
284. See Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative
Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 81-87 (1990) (discussing
politicians' varied motives).
285. See Kenneth W. Abbott, The Trading Nation's Dilemma: The Functions of the Law of
International Trade, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 501, 522 (1985).
286. See Kenneth W. Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution: Building a Private-
Interests System of Justice, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 111, 142-43 (1992) (noting that in national
systems based on separation of powers, political branches have procedures for responding to judicial
decisions that they see as inappropriate or socially harmful).
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cal check on the outcomes.' A "wrong" decision can be overturned only by
treaty amendment, an extremely slow and cumbersome process."
Moreover, in domestic litigation, the judges generally will be attuned to
the popular willy'9 They are usually residents of the country in question who
were elected or appointed through a political process. International dispute
settlement, in contrast, typically involves individuals from third countries who
might have little understanding of the particular domestic norms and concerns
of the countries that are parties to the dispute.
D. Inflexibility
Legalistic dispute settlement is likely to prove inflexible. Regime main-
tenance requires a mechanism for accommodating the treaty to changing cir-
cumstances and issues. In the case of the GATT, for example, trade "pragma-
tists" historically have been concerned that some of the original GATT norms
became obsolete over time and were no longer generally complied with.2"°
Nevertheless, if a contracting party were to challenge a trade measure that
violated such a norm, a dispute settlement panel probably would strike the
measure down, even though a political consensus supporting the norm no
longer existed. The new WTO/GATT Agreement has alleviated this concern
since it reflects a new consensus, but the problem of treaty adaptation is a
continuing one. An ideal dispute settlement system would be flexible enough
to use "creative interpretation" as a means of treaty revision.29'
In particular, in the case of international taxation, there is a danger that a
legalistic dispute settlement system would strictly interpret treaty language in
ways that would interfere with efforts to solve emerging problems. 2' Specifi-
cally, tax measures designed to combat international tax avoidance sometimes
will impose greater burdens on foreign and foreign-owned enterprises than on
purely domestic enterprises. A legalistic dispute settlement system might in-
terpret a treaty nondiscrimination or national treatment rule to prohibit such
measures, even if there were an international political consensus that such
measures are appropriate.
287. See Trimble, supra note 3, at 1026-28; see also Shell, supra note 140, at 906 (raising
specter of "governance by a group of unelected, multinational judges striking down domestic laws on the
basis of economic theory").
288. See Abbott, supra note 286, at 143 (noting that GATr procedure for joint action by
contracting parties has not been used extensively and might be resisted); Transcript of Discussion
Following Presentation by Kenneth W. Abbott, supra note 184, at 155-56 (1992) (remarks of Robert E.
Hudec) (noting that GATT lacks adequate legislative filter capable of overruling wrong decisions).
289. See Trimble, supra note 3, at 1027 (arguing that unelected judges are products of domestic
political system and are responsive to political changes in society).
290. See Davey, supra note 3, at 108; Hudec, supra note 3, at 160-63.
291. See CHA'YES & CHAYEs, supra note 171, at209, 211-13.
292. The Federal Income Tax Project states:
The United States should not adopt a mechanistic or overly-technical approach to deter-
mining whether a proposed legislative provision is inconsistent with treaties....
Certain legislative enactments may conflict with the literal terms of an existing treaty,
but would not be inconsistent with the expectations of the treaty partner. Such changes
should be permitted to take effect without modifying the treaty.
FEDERAL INcoME TAX PRoJECr, supra note 26, at 78-79.
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Consider, for example, thin capitalization rules. One of the ways that
multinationals can shift income among tax jurisdictions is through strategic use
of debt financing. For income tax purposes, interest payments are generally
deductible by the payor and includable in the income of the recipient. There-
fore, if a parent corporation in one country makes a loan to a subsidiary in an-
other country, the interest payments will shift taxable income from the sub-
sidiary to the parent corporation. A number of countries have enacted income
tax measures to prevent the erosion of their corporate income tax base through
such "thin capitalization" of foreign-owned domestic corporations. These
measures generally deny the thinly capitalized domestic corporation a deduc-
tion for interest paid to related foreign parties on excessive debt. The United
States enacted such a measure in 1989 .' 9 Although Congress argued that this
measure is nondiscriminatory,2' its argument is not very persuasive. 95
Two provisions of the nondiscrimination article of the OECD Model Tax
Convention seem to prohibit thin capitalization rules that apply, either facially
or in practice, only to interest paid to nonresidents. The OECD, however, has
resorted to creative interpretation to prevent the model treaty from acting as a
bar to such measures,29 which the OECD countries apparently regard (at least
in some cases) as an appropriate response to the tax avoidance behavior of
multinationals.
First, paragraph 4 of article 24 ("Non-discrimination") of the OECD
Model Tax Convention provides in part that interest paid by an enterprise of
one treaty country to a resident of another treaty country shall be deductible,
in computing the enterprise's taxable income, under the same conditions as if
it had been paid to a resident of the first treaty country.' 9 An exception is
made when certain other treaty provisions apply, including paragraph 1 of ar-
ticle 9 ("Associated Enterprises"). 98 This paragraph provides that if related
enterprises engage in commercial or financial transactions that differ from
those in which independent enterprises acting at arm's length would have en-
gaged, the treaty countries may adjust the taxable income of the enterprises to
reflect the arm's length result."9 In its report on thin capitalization rules, the
OECD argued that article 24(4) does not prohibit thin capitalization rules-
even those that apply only to interest paid to nonresidents-as long as they
disallow deductions for interest payments only when the payor is excessively
debt-financed in relation to similar independent enterprises operating at arm's
293. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7210(a), 103 Stat.
2106, 2339-42 (1989) (enacting I.R.C. § 1630)). Under § 163(j), interest paid by a corporation to a
related, tax-exempt (e.g., foreign) party is not deductible under certain conditions-generally, to the extent
that the payor's interest expense exceeds 50% of its adjusted taxable income and its debt-to-equity ratio
exceeds 1.5:1. See id.
294. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-386, at 568-70 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3018, 3171-73 (quoting managers of Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989 arguing that U.S. thin
capitalization rule does not violate tax treaty rules and, in particular, is consistent with treaty
nondiscrimination rules).
295. See FEDERAL INcoME TAX PORtocr, supra note 26, at 258-59, 280-82 (refuting
congressional arguments that thin capitalization rule does not violate tax treaty nondiscrimination rules).
296. See Vann, supra note 34, at 108.
297. See OECD MODEL TAX CoNvENnoN, supra note 36, art. 24(4) commentary, paras. 55-56,
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length with creditors."t This interpretation of article 24(4) is strained for two
reasons. First, as the OECD report acknowledges, the arm's length standard
provides virtually no guidance for determining when debt financing is "exces-
sive."301 Second, it is one thing to say that article 24(4) is subject to the ad-
justment authority of article 9, but another thing to say, as the OECD report
does, that this adjustment authority can be applied discriminatorily to pay-
ments to nonresidents without violating the nondiscrimination article. 2
Second, article 24(5) prohibits one treaty country from taxing enterprises
that are owned or controlled by residents of the other treaty country in a man-
ner that is more burdensome than the manner in which it taxes similar domes-
tically owned and controlled enterprises. The OECD's treatment of article
24(5) is also strained. On its face, this provision seems to prohibit thin capi-
talization rules that apply only to foreign-owned firms. The OECD report
"solves" this problem by arguing that article 24(5) should be interpreted more
narrowly than its language would indicate-in particular, that it should be in-
terpreted to prevent only "tax protectionism" and not to prevent anti-tax-
avoidance measures. 3 The OECD report further argues that because article
24(5) is written in general terms, it should be treated as subordinate to the
more specific constraint of article 24(4)."04 Therefore, the report concludes,
since thin capitalization measures survive scrutiny under article 24(4),15 they
should not be invalidated under article 24(5)."e
The OECD has announced that it intends to continue its work on thin
capitalization measures. 7 This process is therefore an example of ongoing re-
gime maintenance. More generally, the OECD engages in ongoing flexible
300. See OECD, TmN CAPITALISATION, supra note 265, para. 66(a), at 26, paras. 75-76, at 30-
31; cf. OECD TRANsFER PRICING GUIDELINFS, supra note 2, para. 1.37, at 1-15 to 1-16. The United
States's thin capitalization legislation does not satisfy this test because that legislation is based on a fixed
debt to equity ratio rather than on comparisons of actual firms. See OECD, THIN CAPrrAuSATION, supra
note 265, para. 79, at 31 (noting that when "a fixed debt/equity ratio is employed by the tax authorities [as
an irrebuttable presumption of thin capitalization], then the majority of countries consider that the results
would undoubtedly be inconsistent with the ann's length principle").
Several commentators have argued that section 1630) violates the nondiscrimination articles found
in many tax treaties. See Richard L. Doemberg, The Enhancement of the Earnings-Stripping Provision, 7
Tax Notes Int'l (Tax Analysts) 985, 986-87 (Oct. 18, 1993); Robert J. Misey, Jr., An Unsatisfactory
Response to the International Problem of Thin Capitalization: Can Regulations Save the Earnings Stripping
Provision?, 8 INT'LTAX& Bus. LAW. 171, 191 (1990).
301. The OECD report concedes that an arm's length approach is difficult to apply to thin
capitalization problems because of "the absence of any clear guidelines as to what are the practices adopted
by independent parties, and thus the difficulty of devising any consistent practice . " OECD, THIN
CAPrrAUISATION, supra note 265, para. 25, at 15.
302. See FEDERAL INCOME TAx PROJECr, supra note 26, at 281.
303. Specifically, the OECD report states:
So far as concerns article 24[(5)], the Comnmittee took the view that this paragraph is rele-
vant to thin capitalisation but is worded in very general terms and aims broadly at prevent-
ing "tax protectionism-i.e. the deterrence by tax measures of investment from outside the
country. It had not, the Committee considered, been designed to deal with measures intro-
duced to prevent the transfer of profits in the guise of interest. Because it is in such general
terms, the Committee concluded, it must take second place to more specific provisions in
the treaty. Thus Article 24[(4)] ... takes precedence over it in relation to the deduction of
interest.
OECD, THN CAPrrAI5ATON, supra note 265, para. 66(b), at 27.
304. See id.
305. See id. para. 66(a), at 26-27.
306. See id. para. 66(b), at27.
307. See Preface to OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES, supra note 2, para. 19, at P-6.
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interpretation of tax treaties through its revision of the commentaries to the
OECD Model Tax Convention. °" These commentaries can significantly influ-
ence how countries interpret actual bilateral income tax treaties." For exam-
ple, in North West Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Commissioner,10 the Tax
Court relied extensively on the OECD commentaries in deciding that the
U.S.-Canada Income Tax Treaty prohibits the United States from taxing U.S.
branches of Canadian insurance companies in accordance with section 842(b)
of the Internal Revenue Code. Similarly, in Taisei Fire and Marine Insurance
Co. v. Commissioner, n the Tax Court relied extensively on the OECD com-
mentaries in deciding that a U.S. corporation operating in the United States
was an "agent of independent status" with respect to certain Japanese insur-
ance corporations within the meaning of the U.S.-Japan Income Tax Treaty. 12
VII. CONCLUSION
The dispute settlement procedures in the GATT have evolved into a
highly legalistic, quasi-judicial system. If a trade dispute is not resolved
through intergovernmental consultation and negotiation, it will be referred to a
third party panel for decision. The losing party may appeal the panel's deci-
sion to a standing appellate body. The final decision cannot be blocked by the
losing party. The system monitors compliance and can authorize retaliation in
the event of noncompliance. Policy-level conflicts between domestic laws and
GATT obligations are routinely brought before this system, which stands
ready to judge domestic laws dealing with such politically sensitive subjects as
environmental protection, consumer protection, health and safety, preservation
of national culture, and even national security.
In contrast, the dispute settlement procedures in tax treaties are antile-
galistic. Under most tax treaties, consultations and negotiations between des-
ignated tax officials of the two treaty countries are the exclusive means for re-
solving disputes. There is no assurance that this process actually will produce
a resolution. Even if it does, the resolution is likely to represent a political
compromise rather than a reasoned decision based on the application of legal
rules. Moreover, this mechanism is intended to deal with relatively fact-
specific disputes. It is highly improbable that it will succeed in resolving a
dispute involving a policy-level conflict between a domestic tax law and a tax
treaty obligation. The resolution of such disputes likely will require resort to
diplomatic channels.
Yet, tax treaties and trade agreements are very closely related. They
share the same goal of facilitating international trade and investment, and they
308. See OECD MODEL TAx CONVENTION, supra note 36, para. 9, at 1-3 to 1-4 (1995)
(discussing revision of OECD Model Income Tax Treaty and commentaries as ongoing process).
309. See id. para. 29, at 1-10 (noting that commentaries can "be of great assistance in the
application and interpretation of the conventions [signed by member countries] and, in particular, in the
settlement of any disputes"); Hugh J. Ault, The Role of the OECD Commentaries in the Interpretation of
Tax Treaties, in ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, supra note 121, at 61.
310. No. 4694-94, 1996 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 50 (Dec. 12, 1996).
311. 104 T.C. 535 (1995).
312. If the U.S. corporation was an "agent of independent status," the Japanese corporations
would not be deemed to have a "permanent establishment" in the United States, so their business profits
would not be taxable by the United States under the U.S.-Japan Income Tax Treaty.
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employ similar methods for achieving that goal. Increasingly, the negotiators
of international trade and investment treaties are realizing the potential for in-
come tax measures to be used as barriers to international trade and invest-
ment. In particular, under a widely supported proposal during the Uruguay
Round of GATT negotiations, income tax measures would have been included
under the General Agreement on Trade in Services, and disputes about such
measures would have come under the jurisdiction of the GATT dispute settle-
ment system. The United States, which led the way in promoting a legalistic
dispute settlement system for international trade disputes, led the way in op-
posing this proposal.
To analyze these polar cases of tax and trade dispute settlement mecha-
nisms, one needs a theory of how intergovernmental dispute settlement works.
This Article has drawn upon international relations theory to argue that inter-
governmental dispute settlement systems function as devices for promoting
and maintaining cooperative international regimes.
Drawing upon the study of the iterated prisoner's dilemma, international
relations theorists have argued that international cooperation can emerge and
be maintained if countries mutually adopt retaliatory strategies. These strate-
gies can break down, however, if the players sometimes make errors in inter-
preting one another's actions. A legalistic dispute settlement system can help
solve this problem by making more authoritative determinations, by facilitat-
ing the convergence of expectations necessary for cooperation, and by legiti-
mizing retaliation when it is necessary.
The Article has argued, however, that this function is much more crucial
in the international trade context than in the international tax context. The
GATT system evolved in a context in which countries-particularly the United
States-were resorting to the regular use of unilateral retaliatory strategies in
an effort to maintain international compliance with GATT obligations. Even
countries that traditionally had opposed legalistic dispute settlement proce-
dures in the international trade context ultimately were persuaded that such
procedures were needed to bring these strategies under multilateral control.
Tax treaties have had a different history. The use of retaliatory strategies to
maintain compliance has been rare, and there are reasons to believe that in
most cases such strategies will be ineffective. Therefore, to the extent that le-
galistic dispute settlement procedures are viewed as a means of managing re-
taliatory strategies, they appear to be largely unnecessary in the international
tax context.
International relations theorists have also drawn upon the "assurance
game," or "stag hunt," as well as upon the economic theory of information, to
argue that the maintenance of cooperative regimes depends critically on
knowledge of several elements. These include the requirements of the regime,
the performance of the parties under the regime, the reactions of other parties
to one's performance, and the reputation of the players involved. A legalistic
dispute settlement system can help provide information and help facilitate the
development and dissemination of reputation.
The Article has argued, however, that legalistic dispute settlement is
much more crucial to the performance of this function in the international
trade context than in the international tax context. The restrictions on trade
that come before the GATT dispute settlement system are often "disguised."
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They at least nominally take the form of legitimate domestic measures pro-
moting such purposes as environmental protection, consumer protection, or
the preservation of national culture. Nevertheless, they place a greater burden
on foreign goods than on domestic goods. A legalistic dispute settlement sys-
tem can play a vital role in generating and disseminating information about the
justifications for these measures and their legitimacy under the GATT. In the
international tax context, in contrast, measures that violate a treaty obligation
and their justifications are likely to be much more transparent. Thus, legalistic
dispute settlement will have a less significant role to play in uncovering and
disseminating this information. Employing less confrontational and more
flexible dispute settlement procedures, and using international fora such as the
OECD for interpreting treaties and monitoring countries' practices, are likely
to be more suitable means of providing the necessary information in the inter-
national tax context.
Finally, the Article has argued that legalistic dispute settlement systems
also impose costs on cooperative international regimes. The most significant
costs are not the obvious costs of administering the system. Rather, they in-
clude the possibility that the use of confrontational and adversarial processes
will undermine ongoing relationships; that political forces will lead to con-
spicuous cases of noncompliance that will threaten the prestige of the regime;
that the decisions of politically unaccountable international dispute settlement
bodies will be perceived as lacking in legitimacy; and that legalistic systems
will fail to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate treaty rules to changing
circumstances and issues.
In determining the optimal dispute settlement system for any interna-
tional regime, these costs must be weighed against the benefits discussed
above. Legalistic dispute settlement plays a less critical role in maintaining
cooperation in the tax context than in the trade context. The costs of legalis-
tic dispute settlement are at least as great in the tax context as in the trade
context. Therefore, the balance of costs and benefits suggests that the legal-
istic GATT dispute settlement system is not an ideal model for the resolution
of intergovernmental income tax disputes.
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